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Abstract
This paper presents a theory of trade agreements where "politics" play an central role.
This stands in contrast with the standard theory, where even politically-motivated govern-
ments sign trade agreements only to deal with terms-of-trade externalities. We develop
a model where governments may be motivated to sign a trade agreement both by the
presence of standard terms-of-trade externalities and by the desire to commit vis-￿-vis do-
mestic industrial lobbies. The model is rich in implications. In particular, it predicts that
trade agreements result in deeper trade liberalization when governments are more politi-
cally motivated (provided capital mobility is su¢ ciently high) and when capital can move
more freely across sectors. Also, governments tend to prefer a commitment in the form of
tari⁄ ceilings rather than exact tari⁄ levels. In a fully dynamic speci￿cation of the model,
trade liberalization occurs in two stages: an immediate slashing of tari⁄s and a subsequent
gradual reduction of tari⁄s. The immediate tari⁄ cut is a re￿ ection of the terms-of-trade
motive for the agreement, while the domestic-commitment motive is re￿ ected in the grad-
ual phase of trade liberalization. Finally, the speed of trade liberalization is higher when
capital is more mobile across sectors.
Keywords: trade agreements, domestic commitment, terms of trade, lobbying for pro-
tection, capital mobility.
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The history of trade liberalization after World War II is intimately related with the creation and
expansion of the GATT (now WTO), and with the signing of countless bilateral and regional
trade agreements. Clearly, there are strong forces pushing countries to sign international trade
agreements, and it is important for economists and political scientists to understand what these
forces are. Why do countries engage in trade agreements? What determines the extent and
form of liberalization that takes place in such agreements?
The standard theory of trade agreements dates back to Johnson (1954), who argued that, in
the absence of trade agreements, countries would attempt to exploit their international market
power by taxing trade, and the resulting equilibrium ￿a trade war ￿would be ine¢ cient for
all countries involved. International trade agreements can be seen as a way to prevent such a
trade war. This idea was later formalized in modern game-theoretic terms by Mayer (1981).
Grossman and Helpman (1995a) and Bagwell and Staiger (1999) have extended this frame-
work to settings where governments are subject to political pressures. In these models, as
Bagwell and Staiger emphasize, even politically-motivated governments engage in trade agree-
ments only to correct for terms of trade externalities. Thus, "politics" does not a⁄ect the
motivation to engage in trade agreements.
In this paper we present a theory where politics is very much at the center of trade agree-
ments. In particular, we consider a model where trade agreements help governments to deal with
a time-inconsistency problem in their interaction with domestic lobbies. Maggi and Rodr￿guez-
Clare (1998) showed how such a time-inconsistency problem may emerge in a small-open econ-
omy when capital is ￿xed in the short run but mobile in the long run. The present paper builds
on this idea to develop a fuller theory of trade agreements.1
We start by reviewing the logic behind the domestic-commitment problem that is at the
basis of our theory. This logic is easily illustrated for the case of a small economy. According to
the modern political-economy theory of trade policy, it is not clear why a small-country govern-
ment would want to "tie its hands" and give up its ability to grant protection. For example, in
Grossman and Helpman (1994), lobbies compensate the government for the distortions associ-
ated with trade policy, and hence there is no reason why the government would want to commit
1For a real-world illustration of the possible domestic-commitment role of trade agreements, we refer the
reader to Fernando Salas and Jaime Zabludovsky (2004), who argue that the main bene￿t of NAFTA for
Mexico has been the strengthening of its commitment to maintain an open trade and investment regime.
1not to grant protection. In fact, if the government is able to extract rents from the political
process it is strictly better o⁄ in the political equilibrium than under free trade. But this may
no longer be true when one takes into account that capital can move across sectors. This is
because, given the expectation of protection in a sector, there will be excessive investment in
that sector. Since this happens before the government and lobbies negotiate over protection,
the government is not compensated for this "long-run" distortion. This allocation distortion is
the essence of the domestic-commitment problem.
Next we explain how we develop a political-economy theory of trade agreements based on the
domestic-commitment problem just described. We consider two large countries whose respective
governments are subject to pressures from import-competing lobbies, and where capital is ￿xed
in the short run but mobile in the long run. In this setting, the noncooperative equilibrium en-
tails two types of ine¢ ciency: a domestic time-inconsistency problem and a prisoner￿ s dilemma
arising from the terms-of-trade externality. Starting from the noncooperative equilibrium, the
two countries get a chance to sign a trade agreement. After the agreement is signed, investors
can re-allocate their capital (subject to possible frictions), and then governments choose trade
policies subject to the constraints set by the agreement. A key parameter of the model is the
degree to which capital can move across sectors. This parameter captures the importance of the
domestic-commitment problem: if capital mobility is zero, the model collapses to the standard
one where the only motive for trade agreements is the terms-of-trade externality; as capital
mobility increases, the domestic-commitment problem becomes more severe.
We distinguish between "ex-ante lobbying," which in￿ uences the selection of the trade agree-
ment, and "ex-post lobbying", which in￿ uences the choice of trade policies subject to the con-
straints set by the agreement. Of course, the notion of ex-post lobbying is meaningful only
if the agreement leaves some discretion in the governments￿choice of trade policies after the
agreement is signed. This is the case, for example, if the agreement imposes a tari⁄ ceiling,
so that a government is free to choose a tari⁄ below the ceiling level. This way of thinking
about trade agreements is a signi￿cant departure from the existing models, where agreements
leave no discretion to governments, and which therefore cannot make a meaningful distinction
between ex-ante and ex-post lobbying.2
Another novel feature of our model relative to the existing literature is that it integrates both
2A notable exception is Ornelas (2005), who explores the importance of ex-ante lobbying for the welfare
implications of regional free-trade agreements.
2motives for trade agreements, namely terms-of-trade externalities and domestic-commitment
problems. As we will show, these two motives interact in nontrivial ways, giving rise to inter-
esting empirical predictions.
In the ￿rst part of the paper we present a simple two-period model that, in spite of its
highly stylized nature, is capable of conveying most of our main points, and is useful to relate
our results to the existing literature. As we argue later, the two-period model can be broadly
viewed as a reduced form of a fuller dynamic speci￿cation.
The main results of the basic model are three. First, we show that the degree of capital mo-
bility is a key determinant of the extent of trade liberalization. In particular, we ￿nd that trade
liberalization is deeper when capital is more mobile across sectors. To understand this result,
consider the extreme case in which capital can be freely reallocated after the agreement has
been signed. In this case, the import-competing lobbies su⁄er no loss from trade liberalization,
since capital can exit the a⁄ected sectors and avoid any losses associated with lower domestic
prices. With imperfect capital mobility, however, trade liberalization does generate losses for
import-competing lobbies, so these lobbies will resist trade liberalization. Although our model
generates only a comparative-statics result, it nevertheless suggests a cross-sectional empirical
prediction: we should observe deeper trade liberalization in sectors where capital is more mo-
bile. We are not aware of any empirical work exploring the link between factor mobility and
trade liberalization, but casual observations seem to be in line with our model￿ s prediction: for
example, trade liberalization has been very limited in the agricultural sector, which is intensive
in resources that are not very mobile (e.g. land).
Second, the model generates interesting results regarding the impact of "politics" on trade
liberalization. We ￿nd that, if the domestic-commitment motive for the trade agreement is
strong enough, trade liberalization is deeper when governments are more politically motivated
(in the sense that they care more about political contributions). This contrasts with the stan-
dard theory of trade agreements, where trade liberalization tends to be less deep when govern-
ments are more politically motivated (the reason being that stronger political motivations lead
to a lower trade volume in the non-cooperative equilibrium, hence to a weaker terms-of-trade
externality, which calls for a smaller reduction in tari⁄s). The di⁄erence in predictions arises
from the fact that in our model the domestic-commitment motive for a trade agreement is
directly determined by the presence of politics, whereas in the standard theory politics a⁄ects
trade agreements only indirectly through trade volumes.
3Third, the model can explain why trade agreements typically specify tari⁄ ceilings rather
than exact tari⁄ levels. Tari⁄ ceilings and exact tari⁄ commitments have very di⁄erent impli-
cations. With exact tari⁄commitments, lobbying e⁄ectively ends at the time of the agreement,
since the agreement leaves no discretion for governments to choose tari⁄s in the future. With
tari⁄ ceilings, on the other hand, governments retain the option of setting tari⁄s below their
maximum levels, and this will invite lobbying and contributions also after the agreement is
signed. We show that tari⁄ ceilings are preferred to exact tari⁄ commitments. The broad
intuition is that, if the commitment takes the form of tari⁄ ceilings, lobbies will be induced
to pay contributions ex post, and this will lower the net return to capital, thus mitigating the
overinvestment problem. Interestingly, then, keeping the lobbying game alive can help reduce
the distortions caused by lobbying itself. We also emphasize that our model may help explain
why trade agreements are incomplete contracts, without relying on the traditional causes for
this, such as contracting costs or nonveri￿able information.3
In the second part of the paper we analyze a full continuous-time speci￿cation of the model.
In addition to providing dynamic foundations for the two-period model, this speci￿cation gen-
erates some important insights concerning the dynamics of trade liberalization.
We consider a scenario in which the trade agreement constrains the future path of tari⁄s,
and show that the optimal agreement is made of two components: an immediate slashing of
tari⁄s relative to their noncooperative levels, and a subsequent phase of gradual tari⁄reduction.
The immediate drop in tari⁄s is due to the terms-of-trade motive for the trade agreement, while
the domestic-commitment motive is re￿ ected in the gradual component of trade liberalization.
We also ￿nd that the speed of trade liberalization is higher when capital is more mobile.
Gradualism in our model emerges due to the interaction between frictions in capital mobility
and ex-ante lobbying by capital owners. On their own, governments would want to implement
free trade immediately, so it is costly for lobbies to "convince" them otherwise. The lobbies,
which are composed of capital owners currently "stuck" in the import-competing sectors, are
willing to o⁄er contributions in order to keep some protection in the near future, but not to
3In the literature there are two papers that o⁄er alternative explanations for the use of tari⁄ ceilings in
trade agreements. Horn, Maggi and Staiger (2005) examine the optimal structure of trade agreements in the
presence of contracting costs. They show that, in order to save on contracting costs, it may be optimal to specify
rigid (i.e. noncontingent) tari⁄ ceilings. Bagwell and Staiger (2005) propose a model where tari⁄ ceilings are
motivated by the presence of privately observed ￿and therefore nonveri￿able ￿shocks in the political pressures
faced by governments. The explanation for tari⁄ ceilings proposed in the present paper is quite di⁄erent from
those proposed in the above two papers, since it does not rely on the presence of contracting costs or veri￿cation
problems. We will further discuss the relationship with those papers at the end of section 2.3.
4keep protection far into the future, since by then all the capital will have become "unstuck."
The result is gradual trade liberalization. This explanation, based on domestic commitment
problems and imperfect capital mobility, is novel and ￿we feel ￿empirically plausible.
In our basic model, the trade agreement comes as a surprise to investors. The model can
be easily extended to consider the case in which investors can foresee the trade agreement.
In this case, we show that the qualitative results are the same as in the case of a surprise
agreement, except that the re-allocation of capital occurs partly before the agreement is signed
and partly afterwards. Thus, the domestic-commitment problem is solved in two phases: ￿rst,
the (credible) announcement of an agreement, with the consequent reaction of investors; and
second, the implementation of the trade agreement itself.
We want to emphasize that most of our insights follow from our structural modeling of
the lobbying game, in which interest groups and governments exchange contributions for trade
protection. If we modeled political pressures with a reduced-form approach, by assuming that
governments attach a higher weight to producer surplus than to the other components of welfare,
and we kept lobbies and contributions in the background, we would lose most of our results.
In particular, one might be tempted to model the domestic-commitment problem by assuming
that there is a divergence between ex-ante and ex-post government objectives (e.g. at the
stage of signing the agreement governments maximize welfare, while ex-post they maximize a
combination of welfare and industry pro￿ts). This reduced-form setup would not be equivalent
to our structural setup: for example, in the reduced-form setup there would be no role for tari⁄
ceilings, and there would be no gradualism in trade liberalization.
This paper is related to two literatures: ￿rst, the literature on trade agreements motivated
by terms-of-trade externalities (see the papers cited at the beginning of this introduction); and
second, the literature on trade agreements motivated by domestic-commitment problems. In
this second group, Maggi and Rodr￿guez-Clare (1998) and Mitra (2002) have highlighted the
role of politics in creating demand for commitment, while Staiger and Tabellini (1987) have
focused on purely economic considerations. However, these three papers focus on a single
small economy and do not attempt a full-￿ edged analysis of trade agreements. One important
disadvantage of a small-country model is that it does not allow one to study the interaction
between the terms-of-trade and domestic-commitment motives for a trade agreement.4
4We also note that in Maggi and Rodr￿guez-Clare (1998) the government is only allowed to choose between
two extreme options, namely free trade or no commitment at all. If we want to study what determines the
extent of trade liberalization, we need to allow governments to commit to intermediate levels of trade protection
5A recent paper that considers a two-country model of trade agreements in the presence of
domestic commitment problems is Conconi and Perroni (2005). They consider a self-enforcing
agreement between a large country and a small country, where the only motive for a trade
agreement is a domestic commitment issue that a⁄ects the small country.5 In contrast, our
model integrates both motives for trade agreements, namely terms-of-trade externalities and
domestic-commitment problems. Another important di⁄erence is that they take a reduced-form
approach where there is a divergence between ex-ante and ex-post objectives of the governments.
As we pointed out above, this approach is not equivalent to our structural approach where
lobbying and contributions are explicitly modeled; most of our points could not be made with a
reduced-form approach. In any event, Conconi and Perroni￿ s paper makes very di⁄erent points
from ours, as they focus on the implications of the self-enforcement constraints and argue that
they can explain the granting of temporary Special and Di⁄erential treatment to developing
countries in the WTO.
Also related to our paper is the literature on gradual trade liberalization. This literature
includes Staiger (1995), Deveraux (1997), Furusawa and Lai (1999), Chisik (2003), Bond and
Park (2004), Conconi and Perroni (2005) and Lockwood and Zissimos (2005). In these papers,
gradual trade liberalization is explained as a consequence of the self-enforcing nature of the
agreements. Indeed, in these models trade liberalization would occur at once if agreements
were perfectly enforceable, or if players were su¢ ciently patient.6 In our model, on the other
hand, gradualism emerges even though agreements are perfectly enforceable; as we remarked
above, gradualism in our model is a consequence of the interaction between frictions in capital
mobility and lobbying by capital owners.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the basic two-period model; section 3
presents the full continous-time model; and section 4 o⁄ers some concluding remarks.
￿which we do in the present paper. Moreover, that paper does not consider the possibility that lobbies might
in￿ uence the shaping of the trade agreement ("ex-ante" lobbying), which plays an important role in the present
paper. Finally, in this paper we allow for imperfect capital mobility, whereas Maggi and Rodr￿guez-Clare (1998)
only consider the case of perfect capital mobility.
5Conconi and Perroni (2004) consider a model of self-enforcing international agreements between two large
countries where there is both a domestic commitment problem and an international externality. This paper is
di⁄erent from ours in that it analyzes issues of self-enforcement in a model with very little structure and thus
o⁄ers no implications for the extent of trade liberalization brought about by trade agreements, which is the
focus of our present paper.
6One exception is Furusawa and Lai (1999), where trade liberalization may be gradual even with perfect
enforceability if there are market imperfections, such as job-search externalities, that lead to excessively fast
exit under immediate liberalization (as in Mussa, 1986). Our explanation of gradualism does not rely on such
market imperfections.
62 A two-period model
In this section we present a very stylized two-period model that allows us to convey most
of our main points in a relatively familiar setting. In the next section we will examine a
fully dynamic model where time is continuous and the horizon is in￿nite, and there it will
become clear that the two-period model can be broadly viewed as a reduced form of the full
dynamic speci￿cation. Presenting the two-period model before moving on to the full dynamic
speci￿cation has two further bene￿ts: it allows for an easy comparison with the results of
previous models, particularly Grossman and Helpman (1995a), Bagwell and Staiger (2001), and
our previous work (Maggi and Rodr￿guez-Clare, 1998); and it is pedagogically useful, because
understanding the results of the continuous-time model will be easier and more intuitive after
seeing the simpler two-period model.
There are two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), and three goods: one numeraire good,
denoted by N, and two manufacturing goods, denoted by M1 and M2. In both countries
preferences are given by U = cN +
P2
i=1 u(ci), where ci denotes consumption of good Mi. We
assume u(ci) = vci￿c2
i=2 (where v is a positive parameter), so that the demand function for good
Mi is d(pi) = v￿pi. The consumer surplus associated with good Mi is s(pi) = u(d(pi))￿pid(pi).
There are two types of capital, type 1 and type 2. The M1 good is produced one-for-
one from type-1 capital, and the M2 good is produced one-for-one from type-2 capital. Each
country is endowed with one unit of each type of capital. The only di⁄erence between the two
countries is in the technology to produce the N good: in country H, the N good is produced
one-for-one from type-1 capital, while in country F, the N good is produced one-for-one from
type-2 capital. Given these assumptions, Home is a natural importer of good M1 and Foreign
is a natural importer of good M2.7 The reason we chose this particular production structure is
that it generates a simple symmetric setup where, in each country, capital mobility is relevant
only between the import-competing sector and the numeraire sector. This in turn ensures that
in each country the domestic-commitment motive for trade agreements concerns the import-
competing sector but not the export sector, a feature that simpli￿es the analysis considerably.
Home chooses a speci￿c tari⁄ t on imports of M1 and Foreign chooses a speci￿c tari⁄ t￿ on
7More precisely, under free trade Home imports a nonnegative amount of good M1 and Foreign imports a
nonnegative amount of good M2. Note that this is true for any given allocation of capital. Without imposing
further conditions it is possible that there is no trade in equilibrium, but below we will assume a parameter
condition that prevents this possibility.
7imports of M2. Thus, if tari⁄s are not prohibitive, the domestic price of good M1 in Home is
given by p1 = p￿
1 + t. Similarly, the domestic price of good M2 in Foreign is p￿
2 = p2 + t￿.8
Let x (x￿) denote the level of capital allocated to sector M1 (M2) in country H (F). Welfare
(i.e., utility of the representative agent) is given by factor income plus tari⁄ revenue plus
consumer surplus. Thus, welfare in Home and Foreign, respectively, is given by:
W = (1 ￿ x) + (p1x + tm1 + s1) + (p2 + s2)
W
￿ = (1 ￿ x
￿) + (p
￿
2x
￿ + t
￿m
￿
2 + s
￿
2) + (p
￿
1 + s
￿
1)
where mi (m￿
i) denotes Home (Foreign) imports of good i and si (s￿
i) represents Home (Foreign)
consumer surplus derived from good i. Note the separability between sectors M1 and M2.
Speci￿cally, note that we can express W as the sum of two components: the ￿rst one, (1￿x)+
(p1x + tm1 + s1), depends on t and x; and the second one, p2 + s2, depends on t￿ and x￿. The
same separability applies to foreign welfare. Together with symmetry, this separability implies
that we can focus on sector M1; the equilibrium in sector M2 will be its mirror image. Thus, to
simplify notation, we drop the subscript 1 from now on, and simply refer to sector M1 as the
"manufacturing" sector.
The international market clearing condition for manufacturing is d(p)+d(p￿) = x+1. This
yields
p
￿(t;x) = v ￿
1
2
(x + 1 + t)
p(t;x) = v ￿
1
2
(x + 1 ￿ t)
where we emphasize the dependence of equilibrium prices on the tari⁄and the capital allocation
in the home country.
Letting m = d(p) ￿ x denote imports of manufactures by Home, then m(t;x) = 1
2(￿x ￿ t),
where ￿x ￿ 1 ￿ x is the di⁄erence in supply between the two countries. Given this notation,
8In this paper we do not consider export subsidies and taxes. If the agreement takes the traditional form
of exact tari⁄ and subsidy commitments, this restriction is innocuous, because only net protection (i.e. the
di⁄erence between import tari⁄ and export subsidy in a given sector) matters for the optimal agreement,
therefore t and t￿ can be reinterpreted in terms of net protection in the two sectors. If the agreement takes the
form of tari⁄and subsidy ceilings, on the other hand, not only net protection but also the levels of import tari⁄s
and export subsidies matter, and this makes the analysis substantially more complex. Maggi and Rodriguez-
Clare (2006) study optimal agreements when both import and export instruments are allowed but there is no
capital mobility. We also note that assuming away export instruments is relatively common in the existing
literature on trade agreements: see for example Grossman and Helpman (1995b), Krishna (1998), Maggi (1999)
and Ornelas (2004).
8welfare in Home is:
W(t;x) = (1 ￿ x) + p(t;x)x + tm(t;x) + s(t;x) + [￿]
where [￿] does not depend on t and x. Analogously, Foreign welfare is
W
￿(t;x) = p
￿(t;x) + s
￿(t;x) + [￿]
We now turn to the political side of the model. We assume that, in each country, the
capital owners in the import-competing sector get organized as a lobby and o⁄er contributions
to their government in exchange for protection.9 We model the interaction between lobby and
government in a similar way as Grossman and Helpman (1994). We assume that the political
structure is symmetric in the two countries, so we can focus on the Home country.
The government￿ s objective function is UG = aW +C, where C denotes contributions from
the import-competing lobby. The parameter a captures (inversely) the importance of political
considerations in the government￿ s objective: when a is lower, "politics" are more important.
The lobby maximizes total returns to capital net of contributions, UL = px ￿ C.10 The
lobby collects contributions in proportion to the amount of capital in the manufacturing sector,
thus total contributions are given by C = cx, where c is the contribution per unit of capital.
2.1 The noncooperative equilibrium
The timing of the non-cooperative game is the following. In the ￿rst stage, investors allocate
their capital. The value of x summarizes the choices of investors in this stage. In the second
stage, the government and the import competing lobby in each country bargain e¢ ciently
over tari⁄ and contributions. For simplicity we assume that the lobby has all the bargaining
power (in a later section we will discuss how results would change if the government had some
bargaining power). An equivalent assumption would be that the lobby makes a take-it-or-leave-
it o⁄er to the government that consists of a tari⁄ level and a contribution level.To determine
the subgame perfect equilibria of the game we proceed by backward induction, starting with
9We are implicitly assuming that the export sector and the numeraire sector are not able to get organized.
This is a simple lobby structure that generates trade protection in the political equilibrium.
10This is a shortcut. To be more precise, we should specify the lobby￿ s objective as the aggregate well-being
of its lobby members, but this would give rise to the same results. Letting ￿ be the fraction of the population
that owns some capital in the import-competing sector, the lobby￿ s objective is px+￿(tm+s)￿C, so the joint
surplus of government and lobby is proportional to a+￿
1￿￿W + px, an expression that has the same qualitative
structure as the one we derive below.
9the determination of equilibrium tari⁄s and contributions given the allocation of capital. This
is the equilibrium of the subgame, or the "short-run" equilibrium.
Given the assumption of e¢ cient bargaining, the government (G) and the lobby (L) in the
Home country choose t to maximize their joint surplus:
J
SR(t;x) = aW(t;x) + p(t;x)x
This yields
t = t
J(x) ￿ (1=3)(￿x + 2x=a)
The noncooperative tari⁄ tJ can be decomposed in two parts. The component ￿x=3 captures
the incentive to distort terms of trade: when the supply di⁄erence ￿x is bigger, the volume
of imports is larger, and hence this incentive is stronger. The component 2x=3a captures the
political in￿ uence exerted by the lobby. This component is more important when the sector is
larger (x is higher) and when the government￿ s valuation of contributions relative to welfare is
higher (a is lower). We let the national welfare maximizing tari⁄ (given x) be denoted by
t
W(x) ￿ lim
a!1t
J(x) = ￿x=3
For future reference, we de￿ne c(t;x) as the contributions per unit of capital such that G is
just willing to impose tari⁄ t; or in other words, such that G is kept at its reservation utility
given tari⁄ t. In the absence of contributions, G would choose the welfare maximizing tari⁄
given x; that is tW(x), so G￿ s reservation utility is W(tW(x);x). Since the short-run equilibrium
tari⁄ given x cannot be below tW(x), we only need to focus on the case t ￿ tW(x). For the
government to choose a tari⁄ t ￿ tW(x), total contributions would have to be equal to
a
￿
W(t
W(x);x) ￿ W(t;x)
￿
= (3a=8)
￿
t ￿ t
W(x)
￿2
Thus, the function
c(t;x) ￿ (3a=8x)
￿
t ￿ t
W(x)
￿2
determines the contributions per unit of capital necessary to induce the government to choose
tari⁄ t ￿ tW(x). Note that we need to de￿ne this function only for t ￿ tW(x), since the lobby
would never pay the government to impose a tari⁄lower than the government would choose on
its own.
We now move back one step, to examine the "long-run" non-cooperative equilibrium, where
x is endogenous and is determined according to investors￿expectations about future protection
10in the absence of a trade agreement. Before we proceed, however, it is useful to derive the free
trade long-run equilibrium. Suppose that in this equilibrium Home produces both the N good
and the M good (in a moment we will impose a parameter condition that ensures this). Then
the domestic (and international) price of the M good must be equal to one. Thus the free trade
allocation of capital, xft, is determined by the condition p(0;xft) = 1, or v￿ 1
2(xft+1) = 1. To
ensure that 0 < xft < 1 we impose the condition 3=2 < v < 2.11 We maintain this assumption
throughout the rest of the paper. Note that, because of the symmetry of the model, under free
trade there is no trade in the numeraire sector.
We can now turn to the long-run equilibrium. The equilibrium conditions are:
t = t
J(x)
p(t;x) ￿ c(t;x) = 1 (1)
The second condition requires that the return to capital net of contributions be equal in the
import-competing sector and in the numeraire sector. This equal-returns condition implicitly
de￿nes a curve in (t;x) space that we label xer(t).12
We let (^ t; ^ x) denote a solution to the above system. Also, we let
￿
tW;xW￿
denote the
intersection of the curves tW(x) and xer(t). Note that this is the long-run noncooperative
equilibrium in the benchmark case of welfare-maximizing governments (i.e., (tW;xW) ! (^ t; ^ x)
as a ! 1). The proof of the following proposition, together with all the other proofs of the
paper, can be found in Appendix.
Proposition 1 If a > (6v ￿ 7)=6(2 ￿ v) there exists a unique long-run noncooperative equi-
librium. In this equilibrium each country imposes a positive but non-prohibitive tari⁄ ^ t. The
equilibrium tari⁄ ^ t is decreasing in a, and approaches tW as a ! 1.
Figure 1 illustrates the long-run noncooperative equilibrium. In the ￿gure, the tJ(x) curve
is increasing, but nothing would change if it were decreasing. To understand the shape of the
xer(t) curve, note that since the lobby has all the bargaining power and extracts all the joint
surplus, tJ(x) maximizes the net returns to capital in the M sector (i.e. p￿c). Given concavity
of JSR in t, this implies that p ￿ c is increasing in t below the tJ(x) curve and is decreasing in
11If v ￿ 3=2 then xft = 0; so there is no import-competing industry, and if v ￿ 2 then xft = 1; so there is no
trade at all.
12Since we de￿ned the function c(t;x) only for t ￿ tW(x), the curve xer(t) is de￿ned only in the region
t ￿ tW(x).
11t above this curve. Under the condition assumed in the proposition, entry into the M sector
has the intuitive e⁄ect of reducing net returns to capital there (i.e., p￿c is decreasing in x). It
follows that, under this condition, the equal-returns curve xer(t) is increasing below the tJ(x)
curve and decreasing above it, with a slope of zero at the (^ t; ^ x) point. In the rest of the paper
we maintain the assumption a > (6v￿7)=6(2￿v), which ensures the existence and uniqueness
of the long-run equilibrium.
Not surprisingly, for any positive but ￿nite level of a, the non-cooperative tari⁄ is higher
than the national welfare-maximizing tari⁄: ^ t > tW. Also, from inspection of Figure 1, it is
clear that the noncooperative equilibrium allocation ^ x exceeds the allocation that would result
in the absence of politics (i.e. when a ! 1), that is ^ x > xW. As we will show formally in a
later section, this excess of ^ x above xW represents an overinvestment problem, or a ￿long-run￿
distortion associated with the government￿ s lack of commitment vis-￿-vis domestic investors.
Each government is compensated by its lobby for the short-run distortion associated with
protection (i.e. the consumption distortion given x), but is not compensated for the long-run
allocation distortion. For this reason a government may value a commitment to a lower level
of the tari⁄. This is the heart of the domestic-commitment motive for trade agreements, which
operates alongside the standard terms-of-trade motive.13 We are now ready to examine the
optimal agreement.
2.2 The optimal trade agreement
We suppose that, before capital is allocated, the two governments can sign a trade agreement.
In Maggi and Rodr￿guez-Clare (1998) we assumed that lobbies do not in￿ uence the selection of
the trade agreement, i.e. there is no ex-ante lobbying. Here we allow for ex-ante lobbying by
assuming that the agreement maximizes the ex-ante joint surplus of the two governments and
the two lobbies.14
13The reader might wonder whether our results rely on the assumption that the supply of the M good is
￿xed (at 1 + x) in the short run. If supply were responsive to prices also in the short run (which would be the
case if we introduced a fully mobile factor ￿e.g. labor ￿in the model), the short-run distortion associated with
trade protection would include also a production distortion (misallocation of labor), not just a consumption
distortion, but the main qualitative results of the model would be unlikely to change.
14This e¢ cient-agreement approach can be justi￿ed as equivalent to a more structural game between govern-
ments and lobbies. One possibility would be to consider a game along the lines of Grossman and Helpman￿ s
(1995) "Trade Talks" model. Suppose that (1) each lobby o⁄ers a contribution schedule to its own government;
and (2) governments bargain e¢ ciently (with symmetric bargaining powers) given the contribution schedules.
One can show that the equilibrium outcome of this game maximizes the joint surplus of governments and lob-
bies. Note that, given the symmetry of the model, there is no need to have international transfers for this
12The agreement maximizes the following objective:
￿ = U
G + U
G￿
+ U
L + U
L￿
(2)
where UG, UG￿, UL and UL￿ denote the second-stage payo⁄s of the governments and lobbies as
viewed from the ex-ante stage. In section 2.4 we will discuss how results would change in the
absence of ex-ante lobbying (i.e. if the agreement maximizes UG + UG￿).
The trade agreement is assumed to be perfectly enforceable. In the concluding section we
will discuss how the insights of our model might extend to a setting of self-enforcing agreements.
We assume that the inherited level of x at the agreement stage is equal to b x, the long-
run equilibrium allocation in the absence of an agreement. The interpretation is that the
commitment opportunity comes as a surprise to the private sector. In section 3.1 we show that
this element of surprise is not essential to our main results: if the agreement is fully anticipated
by investors, the qualitative results are essentially preserved.
Following the agreement, but before trade policy is determined, each capital owner gets
a chance to reallocate her capital with probability z 2 [0;1]. Assuming that capital-owners
are "small" and that the opportunity to reallocate their capital is independent across capital
owners, this implies that a fraction z of the capital in sector M has the opportunity to exit.
The parameter z captures the ease with which capital can be reallocated. The case z = 0
captures the case in which capital is "stuck" in the M sector, whereas the case z = 1 captures
a situation in which capital is perfectly mobile in the long run but ￿xed in the short run. With
a slight abuse of terminology, from now on we refer to the case z = 1 simply as "perfect capital
mobility", and to the case z < 1 as "imperfect capital mobility".
To recapitulate, the timing of the model is as follows: (1) the agreement is selected; (2)
capital is reallocated (when feasible); and (3) given the capital allocation and the constraints
(if any) imposed by the agreement, each government-lobby pair chooses a tari⁄.
Again, given separability and symmetry across the two manufacturing sectors, we can an-
alyze them independently. Thus, just as in the previous sections, we can focus on sector M1
(omitting subscripts) and ￿nd the optimal agreement by maximizing the joint surplus of the
two governments and Home￿ s import-competing lobby in this sector.
We will consider two forms of agreement: agreements that specify tari⁄ ceilings, that is
constraints of the type t ￿ ￿ t, and agreements that specify exact tari⁄ levels, that is constraints
result to hold; but in a more general asymmetric situation, transfers would be needed in order to justify a
joint-surplus-maximizing approach.
13of the type t = ￿ t. The main di⁄erence between these two types of agreement is that in the case
of exact tari⁄ commitments the lobby will not have to pay contributions to obtain protection
ex-post, since such protection is e⁄ectively part of the agreement. Under tari⁄ ceilings, on the
other hand, the government can credibly threaten to impose its unilateral best tari⁄ tW(x) (if
tW(x) < ￿ t). Thus, the lobby would have to compensate the government for deviating from this
tari⁄, and there would be positive contributions ex-post. In what follows we characterize the
optimal agreement with tari⁄ ceilings. In section 2.3 we will show that tari⁄ ceilings weakly
dominate exact tari⁄ commitments.
It is instructive to start by characterizing and contrasting the two benchmark cases of perfect
capital mobility (z = 1) and ￿xed capital (z = 0), and then consider the more general case of
imperfect capital mobility.
Perfect capital mobility
Recall that the optimal agreement maximizes the ex-ante joint surplus of the two govern-
ments and the importing lobby in each sector. Given that b x is the inherited allocation of capital,
this objective function can be written as:
￿(t;x) = aW(t;x) + aW
￿(t;x) + xp(t;x) + (b x ￿ x) (3)
This expression is valid only for x ￿ b x, but we do not need to consider the alternative case
x > b x, because this can never hold in equilibrium. To gain a better understanding about this
objective function, note that ￿ = JSR+aW ￿+(b x￿x). There are two extra terms relative to the
short-run objective JSR: the term aW ￿, which takes into account terms of trade externalities,
and the term (b x ￿ x), which captures the rents of those lobby members that will move to the
N sector in the following period.
The analysis proceeds by backward induction, in three steps: (i) we solve for the equilibrium
tari⁄ and contribution as functions of the tari⁄ ceiling and the capital allocation, t(￿ t;x) and
c(￿ t;x);15 (ii) we solve for the equilibrium allocation as a function of the tari⁄ ceiling, x(￿ t); and
(iii) we express the ex-ante objective ￿ as a reduced-form function of the ceiling ￿ t and then
￿nd the optimal ceiling.
To derive t(￿ t;x), notice that this is the tari⁄ that maximizes JSR(t;x) subject to the con-
straint t ￿ ￿ t, and recall that JSR(t;x) is concave in t and maximized at tJ(x). Therefore, if
15Note that we are using the same notation c() as for the contribution schedule in the noncooperative equi-
librium, even though this is not the same function. This is an abuse of notation, but the reader can distinguish
the two functions because the ￿rst argument is t in one case and ￿ t in the other.
14￿ t ￿ tJ(x) the tari⁄ ceiling is not binding, hence t(￿ t;x) = tJ(x); and if ￿ t < tJ(x) the ceiling
is binding, so t(￿ t;x) = ￿ t. Summarizing, t(￿ t;x) = minf￿ t;tJ(x)g. Note that there is no loss of
generality in focusing on agreements in which ceilings are not redundant, i.e. ￿ t ￿ tJ(x). Thus,
from now on we simplify notation by simply using ￿ t rather than t(￿ t;x).
Turning to c(￿ t;x), the key observation is that, if ￿ t > tW(x), then the home government will
get contributions, because its outside option in the negotiation with the lobby is given by the
tari⁄ tW(x), and the lobby has to compensate G for raising the tari⁄ towards the ceiling ￿ t; on
the other hand, if ￿ t < tW(x) no contributions will be forthcoming, because G has no credible
threat. Thus
c(￿ t;x) =
￿
(3a=8x)
￿
￿ t ￿ tW(x)
￿2 if ￿ t ￿ tW(x)
0 if ￿ t < tW(x)
The next step is to derive the equilibrium allocation conditional on ￿ t. Clearly, if ￿ t > ^ t then
the tari⁄ceiling is not binding, and the equilibrium will be given by (^ t; ^ x), just as if there were
no agreement. On the other hand, if ￿ t ￿ ^ t then the equilibrium allocation is implicitly de￿ned
by the equal-returns condition
p(￿ t;x) ￿ c(￿ t;x) = 1
We let xer(￿ t) denote the solution in x to the above equation for ￿ t ￿ ^ t.16 Figure 2 illustrates the
curve xer(￿ t). Below the tW(x) curve, this is a line with slope one (because in this region the
condition that de￿nes it is p(￿ t;x) = 1), and between the curves tW(x) and tJ(x) it coincides
with the equal-returns curve in the absence of agreements (which is depicted in Figure 1).
We can now move back one more stage in our backward induction analysis and derive the
optimal trade agreement. Clearly, the optimal tari⁄ceiling is the one that maximizes ￿(￿ t;xer(￿ t))
for ￿ t ￿ ^ t. The next result shows that ￿(￿ t;xer(￿ t)) is maximized at free trade:
Proposition 2 In the case of perfect capital mobility, the optimal agreement is ￿ tA = 0 (free
trade) for all a.
When capital is perfectly mobile, the optimal agreement is free trade even in the presence
of ex-ante lobbying. Intuitively, if capital is mobile, the lobby anticipates that there cannot
be any rents in the ex-post stage, and hence is not willing to pay anything to compensate the
government for the long run distortions associated with protection. This will of course no longer
be true when capital is imperfectly mobile, as we will show below.
16Again, the notation xer(￿ t) is slightly abused because this is not the same function as xer(t), the equal-returns
condition in the absence of agreements, which was de￿ned only for t ￿ tW.
15In this model there are two motives for a trade agreement: the standard terms-of-trade
(TOT) externality and the domestic-commitment problem. We can disentangle the two motives
with the following thought experiment. We consider a hypothetical scenario in which the home
government can commit unilaterally (subject to the lobby￿ s pressures), and characterize the
tari⁄ ceiling that would be chosen in this case (￿ tDC). The movement from ^ t to ￿ tDC can be
thought of as the component of trade liberalization that is due to the domestic-commitment
motive, while the movement from ￿ tDC to ￿ tA = 0 can be thought of as the component due to
the TOT motive.
We can also view this thought experiment from a slightly di⁄erent perspective. A trade
agreement may provide governments with the credibility to make unilateral commitments, not
only the opportunity to negotiate reciprocal commitments. Thus we can think of the bene￿ts
from a trade agreement as stemming from two sources: ￿rst, a country￿ s membership in the
agreement, which allows a country to commit unilaterally, thereby solving its credibility problem
in the domestic arena; and second, the negotiation of reciprocal commitments, which takes care
of TOT externalities.17 In this perspective, what we do here can be interpreted as disentangling
the role of membership from the role of negotiated tari⁄ reductions.
Formally, we consider the following timing: the home government and the lobby choose a
tari⁄ ceiling without negotiating with the foreign government; then capital is allocated, and
then the home government and the lobby choose the tari⁄ given the ceiling and the capital
allocation. The objective is the same as in the previous case except that foreign welfare is not
taken into account. So ￿ tDC maximizes
J(￿ t;x) ￿ aW(￿ t;x) + xp(￿ t;x) + (b x ￿ x)
subject to x = xer(￿ t). The following result characterizes ￿ tDC:
Proposition 3 In the case of perfect capital mobility, if a government can commit unilaterally
it will choose ￿ tDC = tW.
This result is illustrated in Figure 2. Note that the TOT component of the agreement, i.e.
the di⁄erence ￿ tDC￿￿ tA, is just given by tW, which is the tari⁄that optimally exploits a country￿ s
17We emphasize however that this decomposition into gains from membership and gains from negotiated
commitments is purely conceptual, and may not have an empirically observable counterpart. When a group of
countries gets together to form a trade agreement, to the extent that the agreement is motivated by both TOT
and domestic-commitment considerations, the agreed-upon tari⁄cuts are likely to incorporate both motivations.
16monopoly power over TOT (taking into account the endogeneity of the allocation x). Thus, the
TOT component of the agreement removes the economically-motivated part of trade protection,
while the domestic-commitment component of the agreement removes the politically-motivated
part of trade protection.18
It is important to note that the TOT component of the agreement is independent of politics,
i.e. tW is not a⁄ected by a (straightforward algebra reveals that tW = 1 ￿ v
2). On the other
hand, the domestic-commitment component of the agreement, ^ t ￿ ￿ tDC, is larger when politics
are more important (a is lower).19
Fixed capital
In the previous section we derived the optimal agreement for the case in which capital can
be freely reallocated after the agreement is signed. We now consider the opposite extreme, in
which capital cannot be re-allocated at all (z = 0). It is useful to consider this benchmark case
for two reasons: ￿rst, the more general case of imperfect capital mobility (z 2 [0;1]) will be
easier to understand after looking at the extreme cases z = 1 and z = 0; and second, the case
of ￿xed capital will serve to establish the link between this model and the "standard" models
in which trade agreements are motivated only by TOT externalities.
If capital is ￿xed at some level x, the optimal tari⁄ceiling is simply the one that maximizes
￿(￿ t;x).20 Letting t￿(x) ￿ argmax￿ t ￿(￿ t;x), it is easy to show that t￿(x) = x
a (see Figure 2).
Note that t￿(x) lies uniformly below tJ(x) for x ￿ ^ x, thus the extent of trade liberalization is
given by tJ(x) ￿ t￿(x) > 0.
Next we want to decompose the optimal agreement into its domestic-commitment and
18A natural question is whether there exists a domestic-commitment motive for trade agreements even in the
absence of politics (i.e. if governments maximize welfare). In our model the answer is no. To see this note
that ^ t approaches tW as a ! 1, which implies that there is no need for domestic commitment. Intuitively,
with no politics, the government sets the tari⁄ to maximize national welfare given x (i.e., t = tW(x)), and as
a consequence the investors￿allocation decisions are e¢ cient, yielding the (unilateral) optimal point (tW;xW).
We note that this is a consequence of the supply structure assumed in our model, and does not hold more
generally (for example, in Lapan, 1988, there is a time-inconsistency problem in tari⁄ setting even though the
government maximizes welfare). We regard this feature of our model as a useful simpli￿cation that allows us to
focus sharply on politics as a determinant of the domestic commitment motive for trade agreements.
19The feature that the TOT component of the agreement is independent of politics is a consequence of
perfect capital mobility, and does not hold when capital is imperfectly mobile, as will become clear in the next
sections. But the case of perfect capital mobility is an important benchmark to keep in mind, because it helps
to understand why the predictions of our model regarding the impact of politics on trade liberalization di⁄er
from those of the standard TOT theory.
20This follows immediately from the fact that the equilibrium tari⁄ is equal to the ceiling level (t = ￿ t). Note
also that, with ￿xed capital, tari⁄ ceilings are equivalent to exact tari⁄ commitments, so the same points can
be made by looking at either form of commitment.
17TOT components. Following the methodology described before, we consider the domestic-
commitment benchmark when x is ￿xed. The optimal tari⁄ ceiling in this case maximizes
J(￿ t;x) for given x. Clearly, this objective is maximized by tJ(x), that is, the optimum involves
no agreement at all. We can conclude that, when x is ￿xed, the domestic-commitment compo-
nent of the agreement is nil, and the whole tari⁄ cut is coming from the TOT component. A
domestic-commitment motive for trade agreements is present only if capital is mobile.
At this point it is useful to relate this case of ￿xed capital with the standard TOT story,
and more speci￿cally with Grossman and Helpman￿ s (GH) (1995a) model. Note that our model
with ￿xed capital is essentially a simpli￿ed version of GH￿ s model. To see this, note that ￿(￿ t;x)
reduces to
￿(￿ t;x) = aW(￿ t;x) + aW
￿(￿ t;x) + xp(￿ t;x) + (￿)
where we omit the term in (￿) because it is constant in ￿ t. This is the joint surplus of the two
governments and the lobby. As in GH￿ s model, the optimal agreement maximizes this joint
surplus.
Next consider the impact of the political parameter a on the extent of trade liberalization. It
is easy to verify that the agreed-upon tari⁄cut is given by tJ(x)￿t￿(x) = m(tJ(x);x). Thus the
tari⁄ cut is deeper when the noncooperative import volume is higher. This is intuitive: when
imports are larger, the TOT externality is more important, and hence the trade agreement will
cut the tari⁄ by a larger amount. The observation that trade liberalization is increasing in the
import volume has a straightforward implication for the comparative-statics e⁄ect of changes
in a: when politics are more important (a is lower), the noncooperative tari⁄tJ is higher, hence
the import volume is lower, and as a consequence the agreed-upon tari⁄ cut is less deep.21
This prediction regarding the impact of "politics" on the extent of trade liberalization is
a fairly general feature of models where trade agreements are motivated only by TOT ex-
ternalities, as emphasized by Bagwell and Staiger (2001). This contrasts sharply with our
earlier ￿nding in the case of perfect capital mobility, where we found that the extent of trade
liberalization is decreasing in a. This result points to an important insight: when the domestic-
commitment motive for a trade agreement is important, the impact of "politics" on the extent
21How can this result be reconciled with the observation made earlier, that with perfect capital mobility the
TOT component of the tari⁄ cut (tW) is independent of a? The key is to observe that, with perfect capital
mobility, the TOT component of the tari⁄ cut is also proportional to the import volume m(t;x), but evaluated
at the point (tW;xW), not at the noncooperative equilibrium. Since m(tW;xW) is independent of a, so is the
TOT component of the tari⁄ cut.
18of trade liberalization has the opposite sign as the one predicted by the standard TOT theory.
Imperfect capital mobility
We are now in a position to characterize the optimal agreement for the more general case
z 2 [0;1]. Let us start by considering the equilibrium conditional on a given tari⁄binding ￿ t. To
develop intuition, suppose that ￿ t < ^ t and z is small. From the analysis of the previous section,
we know that if capital were perfectly mobile, the equilibrium allocation would be the one that
equalizes returns given ￿ t, that is xer(￿ t) < ^ x. But if z is small, capital will not be able to exit the
import-competing sector in su¢ cient amount to equalize net returns to capital across sectors.
The allocation will then be xz ￿ (1￿z)^ x and the rate of return will be higher in the N sector.
In general, the equilibrium allocation conditional on ￿ t is maxfxer(￿ t);xzg ￿ ~ xer(￿ t) if ￿ t ￿ ^ t and ^ x
otherwise. This is simply the equal-returns curve truncated at xz.
This result implies that the optimal agreement is the one that maximizes ￿(￿ t; ~ xer(￿ t)) for
￿ t ￿ ^ t. Assuming that investors are risk neutral, what matters for the lobby is only the total
expected future returns for the lobby members, which are given by x(p￿c)+(b x￿x). Thus, the
same expression we had for ￿(￿ t;x) with perfect mobility is valid also with imperfect mobility.
The key is that the parameter z enters the problem only through its e⁄ect on x.
Recall from the previous analysis that, if z = 0, the optimal tari⁄ ceiling is given by t￿(^ x),
and if z = 1, the optimal tari⁄ceiling is zero. The next proposition "connects the dots" between
these two extremes. Let ter(x) be the inverse of xer(￿ t) (in the relevant region xer(￿ t) is increasing,
so its inverse exists).
Proposition 4 (i) The optimal tari⁄ ceiling is given by
￿ t
A =
￿
min(ter(xz);t￿(xz)) for xz ￿ xft
0 for xz < xft
(ii) The tari⁄ cut ^ t ￿ ￿ tA is (weakly) increasing in z:
(iii) The tari⁄ cut ^ t ￿ ￿ tA is increasing in a for su¢ ciently low values of z and decreasing in a
for su¢ ciently high values of z.
Figure 3 illustrates how the optimal agreement point A depends on z. Consider two values of
z, say z0 and z00. For point z0 the agreement is given by A0, located on the t￿(x) curve, whereas
for point z00 the agreement is given by point A00, located on the equal-returns curve. Thus, as
z increases from zero, point A travels along the t￿(x) schedule until it hits the equal-returns
19curve ter(x), and then travels down along the ter(x) curve until it reaches the free trade point
(this path is marked in bold in Figure 3). Note that both t￿(x) and ter(x) are increasing in x,
so the optimal tari⁄ binding decreases as z increases. As a consequence, the tari⁄ cut ^ t ￿ ￿ tA
increases with z, as stated in point (ii) of the proposition.
This result suggests an empirical prediction: trade agreements should lead to deeper trade
liberalization in sectors where factors of production are more mobile. Although our basic model
cannot yield cross-sectoral predictions because there is a single organized sector, it would not
be hard to write a multi-sector model that delivers a genuinely cross-sectoral prediction along
these lines.22
Point (iii) of Proposition 4 focuses on the impact of the political parameter a on the extent of
trade liberalization. Recall from the previous analysis that, if z = 0, the tari⁄cut is deeper when
politics are less important (a is higher). By continuity, this is the case also if z is su¢ ciently
small. On the other hand, we saw that, if z = 1, the tari⁄ cut is deeper when politics are more
important (a is lower). Again, by continuity this is the case whenever z is su¢ ciently high.
Thus the model highlights that, if the domestic-commitment motive is important enough, the
prediction of the standard TOT model ￿that trade liberalization is deeper when politics are
less important ￿gets reversed.
Finally we want to decompose the optimal agreement into its domestic-commitment and
TOT components. We saw earlier that, if z = 0, the optimal domestic-commitment point is
the same as the noncooperative equilibrium (there is no domestic-commitment motive for a
trade agreement), while for z = 1 the optimal domestic-commitment point is (tW;xW). The
next result connects the dots between these two extreme cases and shows that, as z increases,
the optimal domestic-commitment point travels from the noncooperative point (^ t; ^ x) to point
(tW;xW) along the equal-returns curve:
Proposition 5 If a government can commit unilaterally, it will choose
￿ t
DC(z) =
￿
ter(xz) for xz ￿ xW
tW for xz < xW
22Our model suggests also a couple of predictions of a cross-country nature. If one thinks of adjustment
policies (e.g. trade adjustment assistance programs) as increasing the degree of resource mobility (z), the model
suggests that trade agreements should lead to deeper tari⁄ cuts when they involve countries with stronger
adjustment policies. By a similar logic, the model suggests that trade agreements should lead to less deep tari⁄
cuts when they involve countries with more rigid labor markets.
20The domestic-commitment component of the agreed-upon tari⁄ cut, ^ t ￿ ￿ tDC(z), is clearly
increasing in z. What can we say about the e⁄ect of z on the TOT component, ￿ tDC(z)￿￿ tA(z)?
In general the answer is ambiguous, but notice that for small z the TOT component of the
tari⁄ cut decreases with z. To see this, consider a small increase in z from zero. Then ￿ tDC(z)
goes down with in￿nite slope, while ￿ tA(z) goes down with ￿nite slope, therefore ￿ tDC(z)￿￿ tA(z)
decreases. Thus we can say that the liberalization-deepening e⁄ect of factor mobility is entirely
due to the domestic-commitment motive, at least for z relatively small.
2.3 Tari⁄ ceilings versus exact tari⁄ commitments
Thus far we have focused on agreements that impose tari⁄ceilings. In this section we compare
tari⁄ ceilings with exact tari⁄ commitments (ETC), i.e. equality constraints of the form t = ￿ t.
The key di⁄erence is that, if the agreement takes the form of an ETC, the lobbying game
e⁄ectively ends with the agreement, since governments are left with no discretion and hence
there is no scope for lobbying ex post; if, on the other hand, the agreement takes the form of
a tari⁄ ceiling, then lobbying may not end with the agreement. In this section we will argue
that tari⁄ ceilings are generally preferable to ETCs. The reason, as will become clear shortly,
is that keeping the lobbying game alive may reduce the very distortions created by lobbying.
Let us start with an intuitive comparison between tari⁄ ceilings and ETCs. Tari⁄ ceilings
may induce ex-post contributions, while ETCs do not. In our transferable-utility setting, ex-
post contributions per se are a "wash" from the point of view of the joint surplus, but they
nevertheless play an important role, because they a⁄ect the net returns to capital and hence
its allocation, which is relevant for the joint surplus. Formally, c does not enter ￿ directly,
but it a⁄ects ￿ through x. This e⁄ect on the allocation may be bene￿cial because there is an
overinvestment problem in the M sector. We now explore this intuition more formally.
As a preliminary observation, note that in the two extreme cases of ￿xed capital (z = 0)
and perfectly mobile capital (z = 1) celings are equivalent to ETCs: if z = 1, we know that
the optimal ceiling is ￿ tA = 0, which is clearly equivalent to imposing an ETC at t = 0; and if
z = 0, the optimal ceiling and the optimal ETC are both equal to t￿(^ x). But things may be
di⁄erent in the case of imperfect capital mobility (0 < z < 1), to which we turn next.
The analysis of ETCs is similar to that of ceilings, except that, since there are no ex-post
contributions, the equal-returns curve for ETCs is simply de￿ned by p(t;x) = 1, or x￿xft = t.
Notice that for x < xW the equal-returns curve for ETCs coincides with the equal-returns curve
21for ceilings, and for x > xW the former lies below the latter. Intuitively, tari⁄ ceilings induce
ex-post contributions and hence a higher price is needed to equalize returns across the two
sectors. In general, given an exact commitment at level t, the equilibrium allocation is given
by the line x￿xft = t truncated on the left at (1￿z)^ x and on the right at ^ x+z(1￿ ^ x) (which
is the level of x that obtains when a share z of the capital stock in the N sector moves to the
M sector). In Figure 4, this truncated equal-returns curve for ETCs is labeled EE
z (to keep
the ￿gure simple we draw this EE
z curve only for x ￿ ^ x; considering the region x > ^ x is not
essential for the analysis). The optimal ETC is the one that maximizes the objective ￿(t;x) in
(3) subject to the constraint that (x;t) lie on curve EE
z .
We can now compare graphically the problem of ￿nding the optimal ceiling with that of
￿nding the optimal ETC. Recall that the optimal ceiling maximizes ￿(￿ t;x) subject to the
constraint that (x;￿ t) lie on the truncated equal-returns curve for ceilings, which in Figure 4
is labeled EC
z . A key step is to draw the map of iso-￿ curves in (t;x) space. It is direct to
verify that each iso-￿ curve is concave and has a peak on the t (x) curve, as shown in Figure
4. Moreover, the value of ￿ increases as we move toward the left in the map of iso-￿ curves.23
It follows that the optimal ceiling is given by the point of tangency between an iso-￿ curve and
the EC
z curve, while the optimal ETC is given by the point of tangency between an iso-  curve
and the EE
z curve. By graphical inspection, then, a ceiling can achieve a weakly higher level of
￿ than an ETC, because the EC
z curve lies weakly to the left of curve EE
z . Thus we can say
that tari⁄ ceilings perform at least as well as ETCs.
Next we establish that there exists a parameter region in which ceilings are strictly better
than ETCs. Given the shape of the iso-￿ curves, this is the case if the optimal ceiling lies
strictly above the EE
z curve, because in this case the outcome implemented by the optimal
ceiling cannot be implemented by an ETC. If the t (x) curve passes above point W (which is
the case if and only if a < 3v￿4
2￿v ), it is easy to identify a range of z for which this is the case.
23This can be shown by recalling that t (x) is the tari⁄level that maximizes ￿ for given x, and checking that
(i) ￿ is jointly concave in (x;t), which implies that the iso-￿ curves are concave; and (ii) in the relevant range
￿x(t (x);x) < 0, which implies that iso-￿ curves more to the left are associated with higher values of ￿:Also,
for completeness, the statements made in the text require a quali￿cation. In the case of ceilings we only needed
to consider the case x ￿ ^ x, and we de￿ned the objective ￿ only for this case. In the case of ETCs, one has to
consider also the possibility of entry in the M sector after the agreement (x > ^ x), in which case ￿ will include
only the returns to capital currently in the M sector (i.e. the returns to the current lobby members), not capital
that will enter the M sector after the agreement. A consequence of this observation is that, in the region x > ^ x,
the t (x) curve is constant and equal to ^ x=a. It is easy to establish, however, that the qualitative properties of
the iso-￿ curves higlighted above hold also in the region x > ^ x, and hence our arguments are not a⁄ected by
considerations of entry.
22Consider a strictly positive value of z such that xz > xW and t (xz) lies above the EC
z curve,
as in Figure 4. By graphical inspection it is clear that for this value of z ￿and for an interval
of z around it ￿the optimal ceiling lies above the EE
z curve, and hence it is strictly superior to
any ETC.24
The analysis thus con￿rms the intuitive argument made at the beginning of this section, but
with a quali￿cation. While it is true that for a given tari⁄ level a ceiling induces a weakly lower
level of x than an ETC, and hence it is correct to say that ceilings mitigate the overinvestment
problem, the optimal allocation is actually the same in the two cases (x = xz). Thus, a
more precise statement is that ceilings are preferable to ETCs because they allow governments
and lobbies to implement tari⁄ levels closer to the "static" optimum t (x) while still inducing
maximal exit from the M sector. The following proposition records the main result of this
section:
Proposition 6 Tari⁄ ceilings perform at least as well as exact tari⁄ commitments. Moreover,
if a < 3v￿4
2￿v there exists an intermediate interval of z for which tari⁄ ceilings are strictly preferred
to exact tari⁄ commitments.
Proposition 6 highlights that our model can help explain the use of tari⁄ ceilings, which
is pervasive in real trade agreements. Notice that this type of agreement is an incomplete
contract, because it leaves some discretion to governments. The reason the optimal agreement
may be incomplete (even though in our model there is none of the "usual" causes of contract
incompleteness, e.g. nonveri￿able information or contracting costs) is that the agreement cannot
specify the contributions that the lobby will have to pay in the future.25 If the agreement
could specify both tari⁄s and contributions, a complete contract would be optimal. But since
the contract cannot specify contributions, it may be optimal to leave the contract partially
incomplete also in the other dimension, that is tari⁄s.26
24Note that the condition a < 3v￿4
2￿v is compatible with the condition that we assumed for the existence and
uniqueness of the noncooperative equilibrium (a > 6v￿7
6(2￿v)), because 3v￿4
2￿v > 6v￿7
6(2￿v) for all relevant values of v;
thus we have indeed identi￿ed a parameter region where ceilings are strictly preferable to ETCs.
25We believe the assumption that the agreement cannot specify future contributions is not only realistic, but
can also be justi￿ed from a more fundamental perspective. To the extent that there is some capital mobility,
today￿ s lobby members may not be the same as tomorrow￿ s. For this reason it is not very plausible that current
lobby members would be able to commit future lobby members to pay a given amount of contributions. Enforcing
a commitment of this kind seems more problematic than enforcing a commitment for future governments to
respect a trade policy commitment.
26One might object that there is an alternative type of agreement that can accomplish the same objective as
23We note that we have stacked the deck against tari⁄ceilings, by assuming that governments
have zero bargaining power vis-￿-vis domestic lobbies. If governments have some bargaining
power, ex-post contributions will be higher, hence net returns to capital in sector M would be
lower, and the overinvestment problem would be further mitigated.
A question might be raised as to whether the empirical evidence is consistent with the
prediction that the applied tari⁄ is equal to the ceiling level, or in GATT-WTO jargon, that
there is no "binding overhang". In the GATT-WTO experience, developed countries tend to
keep tari⁄s at the ceiling levels, while LDCs tend to apply tari⁄s well below the ceilings. Indeed,
according to Bchir et al. (2005), the share of (non-agricultural) products with zero binding
overhang in developed countries is 85%, while the respective share for developing countries is
35%. This is probably an indication that there are other important factors that play a role in
reality but are not captured in our model, for example uncertainty and contracting imperfections
(as in Bagwell and Staiger, 2005, or Horn, Maggi and Staiger, 2006). In this paper we do not
claim to have a complete theory of tari⁄ ceilings, but we make the more limited point that our
model can contribute to explain the use of tari⁄ ceilings.27
2.4 Ex-ante lobbying and relative bargaining powers
In the basic model we assumed that lobbies can in￿ uence the trade agreement in a similar way
as they can in￿ uence ex-post trade policies, and we focused on the benchmark case in which
governments have no bargaining power. In this section we discuss brie￿ y how the results of the
model would change if these assumptions were modi￿ed.
First we consider the role of ex-ante lobbying. The case in which lobbies can in￿ uence
the shaping of the trade agreement is a natural benchmark to consider, but one can also
think of situations in which lobbies are not involved in the negotiation of the trade agreement.
For example, the institutions of a country might be such that trade negotiators are relatively
a tari⁄ ceiling, namely one that speci￿es an exact tari⁄ level and a tax on capital (or some other policy that
lowers the net returns to capital) in the organized sector. But note that this type of agreement would constrain
not just trade policies but also domestic policies, hence it is likely to involve higher contracting costs (i.e. costs
of negotiating, writing and verifying/enforcing the agreement) relative to one that imposes only tari⁄ ceilings.
The intuitive appeal of tari⁄ ceilings is that they can mitigate the overinvestment problem by leaving more ￿
rather than less ￿discretion to governments.
27Furthermore, it is not clear that the two models mentioned above are fully consistent with the available
evidence: if the only reason for the use of tari⁄ ceilings were the presence of uncertainty and contracting
imperfections, we should observe that, for a given product in a given country, the applied tari⁄ is sometimes at
the ceiling level and sometimes below it ￿but there is no evidence of this behavior in reality.
24insulated from lobbying pressures. If there is no ex-ante lobbying, then the optimal agreement
maximizes UG + UG￿ rather than UG + UG￿ + UL. How would the results change in this case?
With no ex-ante lobbying, the objective function can be written as
aW(￿ t;x) + C + aW
￿(￿ t;x) = aW(minft
W(x);￿ tg;x) + aW
￿(￿ t;x); (4)
where we have used the fact that the Home government￿ s reservation utility given ceiling ￿ t
is given by aW(minftW(x);￿ tg;x). For a given z, the optimal tari⁄ ceiling is the one that
maximizes (4) subject to the constraint that (x;￿ t) lie on the truncated equal-returns curve, EC
z .
It is not hard to see that the solution of this problem is ￿ t = 0 for all z.28 Thus we can conclude
that, in the absence of ex-ante lobbying, the optimal agreement entails free trade for any degree
of capital mobility. It is important to note, however, that this extreme result depends on the
extreme assumption that lobbies have all the bargaining power. As we argue next, this may no
longer be the case if governments have bargaining power.
Next we discuss the role of the assumption that governments have no bargaining power
vis-￿-vis their domestic lobbies. This is a convenient assumption because in this case the
government does not derive any rents from the political process, and hence it has a strong
desire to foreclose domestic political pressures. If the government has some bargaining power,
however, the domestic-commitment motive for a trade agreement is weaker. The question then
is, how do our results change when we drop the assumption that the lobby has all the bargaining
power?
The main change in results is that ceteris paribus trade liberalization tends to be less deep,
and the parameter region for which the optimal agreement entails free trade is smaller. This
is true both in the presence and in the absence of ex-ante lobbying. In particular, in the case
of no ex-ante lobbying (as well as in the case of ex-ante lobbying with perfect capital mobility)
there exists a parameter region where the trade agreement does not completely eliminate trade
protection.
Intuitively, when governments have more bargaining power, the noncooperative equilibrium
allocation is less distorted, because ex-post contributions are higher and hence net returns to
capital in the M sector are lower, and as a consequence the domestic commitment motive for
trade liberalization is less important. In addition to this e⁄ect, government barganing power
28To see this, notice that for any given x the objective is maximized at ￿ t = 0. Since W(0;x) + W￿(0;x) is
decreasing in x for x > xft, it follows that the optimal ceiling is always ￿ t = 0.
25tends to reduce trade liberalization through another, more direct channel, which applies in the
case of no ex-ante lobbying: when governments have bargaining power, they can extract rents
from the ex-post lobbying game, therefore they are more reluctant to liberalize trade because
doing so reduces those rents.29
To illustrate this in the simplest way, we consider the opposite case as in our baseline model,
namely the case in which the government has all the bargaining power. For some x consider
the government and lobby negotiating a tari⁄ above tW(x). The rents obtained by the lobby
would be given by:
x
￿
p(t;x) ￿ p(t
W(x);x)
￿
Since the government has full bargaining power, it captures all these rents in the form of
contributions. Thus,
c(t;x) =
￿
p(t;x) ￿ p(tW(x);x) for t ￿ tW(x)
0 for t < tW(x)
The net pro￿t per unit of capital in sector M is then p(t;x) for t < tW(x) and p(tW(x);x) for
t ￿ tW(x). This implies that the equal-returns (or ER) curve now becomes vertical at point
(tW;xW), so that xer(t) = xW for t ￿ tW, and that the long-run non-cooperative equilibrium -
which, as before, is given by the intersection of tJ(x) and ter(x) - is given by ^ x = xW, ^ t = tJ(xW).
Consider now what happens when governments can sign a trade agreement. The ￿rst step
is to write down the ex-ante joint surplus of the two governments and the lobby. Letting ￿ be
an indicator variable that is equal to one if there is ex-ante lobbying and zero if not, we obtain:
￿(￿ t;x) =
￿
a[W(￿ t;x) + W ￿(￿ t;x)] + xp(￿ t;x) + [￿] for ￿ t ￿ tW(x)
a[W(￿ t;x) + W ￿(￿ t;x)] + ￿xp(￿ t;x) for ￿ t < tW(x)
where the terms [￿] do not depend on ￿ t. Given z 2 [0;1], the optimal agreement in our model
is the point that maximizes ￿(￿ t;x) along the truncated equal-returns curve.30
29It is legitimate to ask whether our comparative-statics results are preserved when governments have bar-
gaining power, and in particular whether it is still the case that (i) trade liberalization is deeper when capital is
more mobile, and (ii) with high capital mobility, lower a implies deeper liberalization. It is easy to verify that
result (i) holds even if governments have all the bargaining power. As for result (ii), it may or may not hold
if governments have high bargaining power, depending on the con￿guration of parameters. But the result is
still robust in an important sense. As the previous analysis makes clear, the domestic-commitment motive for
a trade agreement is stronger when capital is more mobile and when governments have lower bargaining power.
Thus the robust aspect of result (ii) is that, if the domestic-commitment motive for a trade agreement is strong
enough, a lower level of a implies deeper trade liberalization.
30To be speci￿c, this is the ER curve truncated at xz = xW(1 ￿ z). If z is such that (1 ￿ z)xW ￿ xft, then
in the relevant region this is just the ER curve; and in the case of ￿xed capital (z = 0), this is just the vertical
line at x = xW.
26Let us ￿rst focus on the case in which there is ex-ante lobbying. In this case, letting t￿(x)
denote the value of ￿ t that maximizes ￿(￿ t;x) given x, we have t￿(x) = a=x. We need to consider
two possibilities, depending on whether t￿(x) passes below or above point (tW;xW). If it passes
below, then the analysis is basically the same as before (i.e., with the government having no
bargaining power), and a result analogous to Proposition 4 obtains. In particular, when capital
mobility is su¢ ciently high, the agreement entails free trade.
Consider now the case in which t￿(x) passes above the (tW;xW) point. It is simpler to
start with the case of full capital mobility, z = 1. By de￿nition of t￿(x), ￿(￿ t;xW) increases
as ￿ t falls from tJ(xW) to t￿(xW) but then decreases as ￿ t continues to fall to tW. On the other
hand, we already know that ￿(￿ t;x) increases as we move along the ER curve from the (tW;xW)
point towards free trade. Thus, there are two local maxima: t￿(xW) and t = 0. Depending on
parameters, either one may be the best agreement. In particular this depends on the height
of the optimal terms-of-trade tari⁄ tW. If tW is low (which is the case when trade volume is
low, which in turn happens when v is relatively high), then t￿(xW) is close to tJ(xW) and the
(tW;xW) point is close to the free trade point. This implies that the decline in ￿ as ￿ t falls from
t￿(xW) to tW exceeds the increase in welfare as we move from (tW;xW) to the free trade point,
hence t￿(xW) is better than free trade.
Now consider the more general case z 2 [0;1]. How does the optimal agreement vary as z
increases from zero? Since t￿(xW) > tW, then the optimal agreement remains at t￿(xW) for
all z if this point is better than free trade. If not, then there will be a su¢ ciently high level z
at which the best agreement switches discontinuously from t￿(xW) to ter(xW(1￿z)), following
this curve until the free trade point as z increases further.
Next we analyze the case in which there is no ex-ante lobbying. To make our points, it
su¢ ces to focus on the case of ￿xed capital (z = 0). As above, we have to distinguish between
the cases in which the curve t￿(x) passes above or below the (tW;xW) point. If it passes below,
then the optimal agreement entails free trade. To see this, note that (i) the point (tW;xW)
dominates any other point (t;xW) with t 2 (tW;^ t], and (ii) the point (0;xW) dominates the
point (tW;xW), since at both points contributions are zero and t = 0 maximizes W + W ￿ for
any x. Finally, since W(0;x) + W ￿(0;x) increases as we move towards x = xft, then the best
agreement entails t = 0 and xft.
Consider now the case in which the curve t￿(x) passes above (tW;xW). Now there are two
candidates for an optimal agreement: t = 0 and ￿ t = t￿(xW). The basic trade-o⁄ is that, in
27the case of free trade, e¢ ciency is maximized but there are no contributions, whereas in the
case ￿ t = t￿(xW) e¢ ciency is not maximal but the government gets some rents. The optimal
agreement may be one or the other, depending on parameters.
In the more general case z 2 [0;1], it is not hard to show that the optimal tari⁄ cut is
weakly increasing in z. Also note that, in the case of perfect capital mobility (z = 1) the
cases of ex-ante lobbying and no ex-ante lobbying are equivalent, because even if the lobby can
participate in the negotiation of the agreement, it will not in￿ uence the agreement, because it
derives no bene￿ts from protection in the long run.
To summarize the points of this section: (i) the presence of ex-ante lobbying tends to reduce
the extent of trade liberalization, compared with the case of no ex-ante lobbying, and (ii) trade
liberalization tends to be less deep when governments have bargaining power vis-￿-vis their
domestic lobbies.
3 The full dynamic model
In this section we consider a continuous-time speci￿cation of the model, where the agreement can
determine the whole future path of the tari⁄ceiling. This analysis is important for two reasons.
First, this will provide dynamic foundations for the reduced-form model considered in the
previous section, and will indicate how the results of that section should be interpreted. Second,
the full dynamic model allows us to address two sets of questions that cannot be adequately
addressed within the two-period model: (i) Does the optimal agreement entail instantaneous
liberalization, gradual liberalization, or a combination of the two? If trade liberalization has a
gradual component, what is the nature of the optimal tari⁄path, and what determines the speed
of liberalization? (ii) In the baseline model we assumed that the agreement comes as a surprise
to investors; how do the model￿ s predictions change if investors can foresee the agreement?
Consider the same model as above, but now suppose that time is continuous, denoted by
s. We assume that at each point in time each capital-owner in sector M gets a chance to
exit the sector with a (constant and exogenous) instantaneous probability z; the arrival of
the opportunity to exit is independent across investors. On the other hand, to simplify the
exposition and the derivation of the main results, we assume that entry into the M sector is
free: that is, owners of capital in the N sector can freely move to the M sector if they wish. A
more symmetric speci￿cation, where there is friction in capital mobility also from the N sector
28to the M sector, would deliver the same results, but the analysis would be more cumbersome.31
We assume that governments and capital-owners discount the future at a common rate
￿ > 0. At each point in time the lobby (which is composed of the capital-owners currently
in sector M) makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er (t;c) to the government. We focus on Markov
equilibria, that is equilibria where players￿strategies depend on the history only through the
state variable x.32
Consider ￿rst the noncooperative equilibrium. It is direct to show that the steady state of
this equilibrium entails x = ^ x, t = ^ t and c = c(^ t; ^ x), just as in the long-run equilibrium of the
two-period model. Intuitively, if x = ^ x and t = ^ t the net returns to capital are equalized across
sectors, hence there is no incentive for capital-owners to move; the lobby cannot do better than
o⁄ering
￿
^ t;c(^ t; ^ x)
￿
to the government, and the government accepts this o⁄er because it cannot
do better on its own.
Next we consider the optimal trade agreement. We start by considering a scenario where the
agreement comes as a surprise to investors, and assume that when the agreement opportunity
arises (at time s = 0) the world is sitting at the steady state of the noncooperative equilibrium.
In section 3.1 we will analyze the case in which the agreement is anticipated by investors.
We assume that the agreement is chosen to maximize the ex-ante joint surplus UG +UG￿ +
UL+UL￿, where Uj is interpreted as player j￿ s payo⁄in PDV terms. The agreement determines
a (fully enforceable) future path for the tari⁄ ceiling, ￿ t(s). (We consider ceilings rather than
ETCs because, just as in the previous section, ceilings perform at least as well as ETCs.) After
the agreement has been signed, at each point in time the lobby makes a take-it-or-leave-it o⁄er
(t;c) to the government, of course taking into account that t is constrained by the agreement.
The ￿rst step of the analysis is to derive the equilibrium paths of x; t and c for a given path
of the tari⁄ceiling ￿ t. We will omit the time argument s whenever this does not cause confusion.
First note that the equilibrium tari⁄ given x is simply t = minf￿ t;tJ(x)g. If ￿ t ￿ tJ(x) the tari⁄
ceiling is not redundant and hence the tari⁄is given by ￿ t, otherwise the tari⁄is given by tJ(x).
31The problem is that without free entry into the M sector, our way of modeling capital mobility would lead
to a discontinuity in the law of motion of x. The rate of change dx=dt would go from ￿zx when the value of
capital in the N sector is higher than in the M sector, to z(1 ￿ x) in the opposite situation. This makes the
optimal control problem harder to solve, but it can be shown that the results hold also in this case.
32Our restriction to Markov equilibria rules out "reputational" equilibria, in which the domestic commitment
problem could potentially be solved without the need for an international agreement if players are su¢ ciently
patient. In the conclusion we discuss how our results are likely to extend to a setting where such reputational
equilibria are allowed.
29The associated contributions are given by c(t;x), just as in the static model.
To characterize the equilibrium path for x, let V M (V N) be the value of a unit of capital in
the M (N) sector. Since there is free entry into the M sector, then in equilibrium it must be
that V M ￿ V N. Moreover, the following no-arbitrage conditions must hold:
￿V
M = z(V
N ￿ V
M) + _ V
M + p ￿ c (5)
￿V
N = _ V
N + 1 (6)
To understand the ￿rst of these no-arbitrage conditions, note that the ￿ ow return to a unit of
capital in the M sector (the RHS of (5)) is composed of three terms: the expected capital gain
from moving to the N sector, z(V N ￿V M); the change in the value of capital in the M sector,
_ V M; and the instantaneous pro￿ts or "dividends," p ￿ c. In equilibrium this ￿ ow return must
be equal to the opportunity cost of holding an asset of value V M, given by ￿V M. The second
no-arbitrage condition (6) is similar, except that because of free capital mobility from N to M
there cannot be capital gains from moving from N to M in equilibrium.
Combining the no-arbitrage equations (5) and (6) and letting y ￿ V M ￿ V N, we obtain:
_ y = (￿ + z)y ￿ (p ￿ c ￿ 1) (7)
Letting g(t;x) ￿ p(t;x) ￿ c(t;x) ￿ 1, integrating and imposing the condition y(s) ! 0 as
s ! 1,33 we obtain:
y(s) =
Z 1
s
e
￿(￿+z)(v￿s)g(t(v);x(v))dv ￿ 0 for all s (8)
It follows from the above discussion that, given a path for the maximum tari⁄ ￿ t(s), the equi-
librium conditions for t(s);x(s) and y(s) are the following:
t(s) = minf￿ t(s);t
J(x(s))g (i)
y(s) satis￿es (8) and y(s) ￿ 0 for all s (ii)
_ x(s) = ￿zx(s) if y(s) < 0 and _ x(s) ￿ ￿zx(s) if y(s) = 0, with x(0) = ^ x (iii)
Condition y(s) ￿ 0 in (ii) is a consequence of the assumption that there is free entry into the
M sector. Condition (iii) simply states that if y < 0 then capital leaves the M sector as fast
33This is a condition that there be no "bubbles" in the asset market. We could replace this by the weaker
condition that y converges to a ￿nite value as s ! 1.
30as possible, whereas if y = 0 then any reallocation is an equilibrium as long as it satis￿es the
physical restriction that capital cannot leave the M sector faster than at rate ￿zx.
We can now derive the optimal agreement ￿ t(s). The objective function is
Z 1
0
e
￿￿s￿(t(s);x(s))ds; (9)
where ￿(t;x) ￿ aW(t;x) + aW
￿(t;x) + x(p(t;x) ￿ 1) + ^ x
We say that a plan (t(s);x(s);y(s)) is implementable if there is an agreement ￿ t(s) such that
(t(s);x(s);y(s)) is an equilibrium, i.e. satis￿es conditions (i)-(iii). We will look for the plan
that maximizes (9) in the set of implementable plans, and then we will identify the agreement
￿ t(s) that implements this plan. To turn this maximization into a more standard optimal control
problem, we let u = _ x and note that any implementable plan must satisfy conditions (i) and
(ii) together with the following "relaxed" condition:
u(s) + zx(s) ￿ 0 for all s ￿ 0, and x(0) = ^ x (iii￿ )
Condition (8), (i),(ii) and (iii￿ ) are necessary for implementability. Our approach is to maximize
the objective (9) subject to these necessary conditions for implementability, and then verify that
the solution satis￿es all implementability conditions. If this is the case, then we have found the
optimal plan.
We need the problem to be concave, so that we can apply su¢ ciency conditions from optimal
control theory. A simple su¢ cient condition for this is a ￿ v￿1
2￿v; we will maintain this assumption
for the remainder of the section.34
We are now ready to state the main result of this section. Let xz(s) denote the path of x
obtained when capital exits the M sector as fast as possible until the free trade allocation is
reached: xz(s) ￿ maxf^ xe￿zs;xftg. Also, as in the previous section, ter(x) is implicitly de￿ned
by g(t;x) = 0, and we let t￿(x) ￿ argmaxt ￿(t;x).
Proposition 7 The optimal agreement entails four phases:
(i) an instantaneous drop in the tari⁄ from ^ t to t￿(^ x);
(ii) a ￿rst gradual liberalization phase in which t(s) = t￿(xz(s)), and y(s) < 0;
(iii) a second gradual liberalization phase in which t(s) = ter(xz(s)), and y(s) = 0;
34We note that the condition in the text is stronger than the one assumed in the static model (Proposition
1), since v￿1
2￿v > 6v￿7
6(2￿v) for all relevant values of v.
31(iv) a steady state in which the tari⁄ is zero.
The optimal path for the allocation is given by x(s) = xz(s) for all s.
This proposition states that the optimal trade agreement entails a discrete tari⁄cut at time
zero, with the tari⁄ dropping from ^ t to t￿(^ x), which is then followed by gradual trade liberal-
ization and exit of capital from the M sector. This gradual trade liberalization is characterized
by two phases. In the ￿rst phase, the tari⁄ is given by the optimal "static" tari⁄ t￿(x) as a
function of the evolving capital allocation, whereas in the second stage the tari⁄is the one that
equalizes net returns across sectors (given the allocation xz(s)). Note that in the ￿rst phase
capital-owners in the M sector want to leave as fast as possible, since the returns to capital in
that sector are lower than in the N sector (y(s) < 0); in the second phase capital-owners are
indi⁄erent as to where to locate their capital (y(s) = 0), but the government induces exit at
the fastest possible rate. After a period of adjustment, the capital stock reaches the free trade
allocation, and the tari⁄ stays at zero thereafter.
An interesting implication of Proposition 7 is that the length of time it takes for the tari⁄
to reach its steady-state value of zero is decreasing in z. Thus, if we de￿ne the speed of
liberalization as the inverse of this length of time, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 1 The speed of trade liberalization increases with the degree of capital mobility (z).
Corollary 1 suggests an interesting prediction of the model: the tari⁄ paths established
in trade agreements should entail faster liberalization for sectors where exit can proceed at a
faster pace. An interesting open question is whether this prediction is consistent with empirical
observations.35
We can now come back to the question of how one should interpret the results of the
reduced-form static model analyzed in section 2, and in particular the comparative-statics re-
sults concerning the degree of capital mobility (z) and the political parameter a (see Proposition
4). Consider ￿rst the result that trade liberalization is deeper when capital is more mobile.
35A natural question that might arise at this point concerns the empirical plausibility of the prediction that
the steady-state level of the tari⁄ is zero. While this seems fairly consistent with reality in the case of regional
trade agreements, such as NAFTA or Mercosur, it is less consistent with the observed history of the GATT-
WTO. However it would not be hard to enrich the model in such a way that the steady-state level of the tari⁄
is strictly positive. For example, the result relies on the assumption that all the capital in the M sector can
eventually be reallocated to the N sector. But if part of the capital cannot be reallocated even in the long run,
then the steady-state tari⁄level may not be zero. Also, if governments have bargaining power vis-￿-vis domestic
lobbies, the trade agreement may not bring tari⁄s to zero (see section 2.4).
32In light of the above analysis, one interpretation of this result is that the tari⁄ cut evaluated
between the time of the agreement and any given point in time T (i.e. ^ t￿t(T)) is larger when
capital is more mobile; or alternatively, as Corollary 1 states, that the tari⁄ falls faster when
capital is more mobile. Similarly, the result concerning the impact of a can be interpreted as
saying that the tari⁄ cut evaluated between the time of the agreement and any given point in
time increases with a when z is su¢ ciently small but decreases with a when z is su¢ ciently
high.36
As in the previous section, we want to understand the role of the TOT motive and of the
domestic-commitment motive in the determination of the optimal trade-liberalization path.
Following a similar approach as in the previous section, we consider the hypothetical case in
which, starting from the non-cooperative equilibrium (b t;b x); each government gets a chance to
unilaterally commit to a future path for the tari⁄ ceiling, but without a trade agreement. In
this case, the objective function that the government maximizes is the same as in (9), except
that it does not include foreign welfare. Let us denote the resulting path as t
DC(s). We can
think of b t ￿ tDC(s) as the domestic commitment component of the trade liberalization path,
with the remainder, that is t
DC(s) ￿ t(s), being the TOT component.
It is straightforward to show that the optimal domestic-commitment path entails tDC(s) =
ter(xz(s)) until the point (tW;xW) is reached. One direct implication is that trade liberalization
associated with the domestic commitment motive takes place gradually, with no discrete tari⁄
reduction. The reason for this is that the government can achieve the desired reallocation of
capital towards the N sector without any reduction in returns to capital in the M sector by
following the path ter(xz(s)) from (b t;b x) to (tW;xW). This implies that the discrete tari⁄ drop
that follows the signing of the trade agreement (from b t to t￿(^ x)) is entirely associated with
the TOT motive, while the domestic-commitment motive is re￿ ected in the gradual component
of trade liberalization. More generally, this suggests that the gradual component of trade
liberalization should be more important, relative to the instantaneous component, when the
domestic-commitment motive is more important relative to the TOT motive.37
36To see this notice that, if z is close to zero, for any ￿xed T > 0 the tari⁄ cut ^ t ￿ t(T) is close to ^ t ￿ t (^ x),
which is increasing in a; and if z is close to one, ^ t ￿ t(T) is close to ^ t, which is decreasing in a.
37An interesting question is whether the TOT component of the trade agreement is gradual or not. The
answer is that it depends. Recall that the TOT motive is responsible for (i) an instantaneous tari⁄ drop from
b t to t￿(^ x), and (ii) a reduction in the steady-state tari⁄ from tW to zero. Thus, if b t ￿ t￿(^ x) < tW ; we can say
that the TOT component of the tari⁄cut is partly instantaneous and partly gradual, but if b t￿t￿(^ x) > tW, then
the TOT component of the tari⁄ cut overshoots its steady-state level, hence we can say that this component is
"anti-gradual". It is easy to ￿nd parameter values for which each of the two cases described above (b t ￿ t￿(^ x)
333.1 Anticipated agreement
We have assumed so far that the trade agreement arrives as a complete surprise to capital-
owners. Of course this is not very realistic: in practice, trade agreements never come as a
surprise to investors, if nothing else because it takes time to negotiate, ratify and execute a
trade agreement. In this section we explore how the model￿ s predictions change if the agreement
is partially or fully anticipated by capital-owners.
Formally, we assume that at time s0 investors learn that at time s1 a trade agreement will
take e⁄ect. We allow for an arbitrary lag between s0 and s1. If s1 ￿ s0 is su¢ ciently high that
there is no capital loss to owners of capital in the M sector at time s0, we can interpret this as
the case in which the agreement is fully anticipated.
Consistently with the previous section, we assume that the agreement maximizes the joint
surplus of governments and lobbies in PDV terms at time s1. We also assume that governments
have no bargaining power, and more speci￿cally, contributions are such that the governments￿
joint payo⁄ (UG + UG￿) is the same as they would obtain in the absence of lobbying.
Let us ￿rst examine the problem at an intuitive level. We can reason by backward induction.
At time s1 the situation is similar to the case of surprise agreement, except that the level of
x may be di⁄erent from ^ x. In particular, letting x1 ￿ x(s1), the agreed-upon path for the
tari⁄ ceiling is the same as in Proposition 7 except that the initial level of x is given by x1
rather than ^ x. Formally, if xz(s;x1) ￿ maxfx1e￿z(s￿s1);xftg denotes the path of maximal
exit starting from x1 until the free-trade level xft is reached, the path of the tari⁄ ceiling is
￿ t(s;x1) ￿ minft￿(xz(s;x1));ter(xz(s;x1))g.
Before moving back to the pre-agreement phase, we need to determine the "ex-ante" contri-
butions paid by the lobby at s1. As we remarked above, these contributions must give the two
governments exactly the joint payo⁄that they would get in the absence of ex-ante lobbying. It
is not hard to show that the optimal agreement in the absence of ex-ante lobbying entails free
trade at all times (as in Section 2.4). As a consequence, ex-ante contributions at s1 are zero for
x1 = xft and are increasing in x1.
We can now examine what happens before time s1. As a preliminary observation, notice
that for all s < s1 the tari⁄ must be equal to tJ(x). Consider ￿rst the case in which s1 ￿ s0
is small, so that the agreement is announced with a short notice. In this case, at time s0 the
higher or lower than tW) obtains.
34value of capital in the M sector drops below that in the N sector (y < 0), both because of the
ex-ante contributions that will be paid at s1, and because for a period after s1 the tari⁄will be
below ter(x). In this case, then, at time s0 capital will start exiting the M sector at maximum
speed, and it will continue to do so after the agreement is signed, until it reaches the free-trade
allocation. Note that in the period from s0 to s1 capital-owners in the M sector derive some
rents (p ￿ c > 1) because tJ(x) is higher than ter(x) for x < ^ x, but since s1 ￿ s0 is small this
cannot compensate the losses caused by the agreement at s1 and beyond; this con￿rms that
investors indeed exit sector M between s0 and s1.
Now consider increasing s1 ￿ s0. Then the capital loss in the M sector generated by the
announcement of the future agreement decreases. This happens because of discounting, because
there is more time to adjust before the agreement takes place (so that x1 gets closer to xft)
and because, as mentioned above, the pre-agreement period entails p ￿ c > 1. If s1 ￿ s0 is
su¢ ciently high, the announcement of the future agreement generates no capital loss in the M
sector, hence in this case there is no immediate exit at s0. Capital will initially stay where it is,
and at some point in time between s0 and s1 it will start exiting. Interestingly, the process of
capital reallocation will not be completed by time s1, but will continue for some time thereafter,
even though the agreement is fully anticipated. Intuitively, it cannot be an equilibrium for x
to reach xft on or before s1: if this were the case, ex-ante contributions would be zero (as we
argued above), and in the pre-agreement period net returns would be higher in the M sector,
hence capital would enter the M sector before the agreement is signed.
The following proposition con￿rms the intuition we just developed:
Proposition 8 An equilibrium exists and must have the following properties:
(i) Between s0 and some point in time ^ s, there is a stationary phase with x = ^ x and t = ^ t.
This time interval (s0; ^ s) is non-empty if and only if the agreement is anticipated su¢ ciently in
advance, i.e. s1 ￿ s0 is su¢ ciently large;
(ii) Between ^ s and s1, the tari⁄ is t(s) = tJ(x(s)), and capital exits the M sector at maximal
speed, but does not reach level xft;
(iii) From time s1 on, the agreement comes into e⁄ect, the tari⁄ ceiling follows the path ￿ t(s;x1),
and capital continues to exit at maximal speed until it reaches xft.
The results of Proposition 8 have a couple of important implications. First, if the agreement
is anticipated there is some reallocation of capital in advance of the agreement; this means
35that part of the overinvestment problem is solved before the agreement actually takes place.
Second, even if the agreement is fully anticipated, the allocation is still distorted at the time of
the agreement, and hence the investors￿anticipation of the agreement is not by itself su¢ cient
to solve the domestic-commitment problem. Thus, the domestic-commitment problem is solved
in part by the (credible) announcement of an agreement, and in part by the signing of the
agreement itself. Finally, we note that the agreement itself is essentially the same as the one
characterized in Proposition 7, except that the level of capital in sector M at the time of the
agreement is lower than b x; thus we can say that the qualitative results of the model hold also
in the case of fully anticipated agreement.
4 Conclusion
In this concluding section we brie￿ y discuss three possible extensions of the model.
First, we assumed that international agreements are perfectly enforceable, while there are
no domestic commitment mechanisms. An alternative approach would be to assume that there
are no exogenous enforcement mechanisms of any kind, so that both domestic and international
agreements must be self-enforced through "punishment" strategies in a repeated game. The
question that arises in this case is the following: if domestic punishments are not enough to
solve the domestic commitment problem, is it the case that international punishments can help
governments live up to their domestic commitments?
A more precise way to formulate the above question is the following. Consider an in￿nitely
repeated version of our model, and compare two punishment strategies: (i) a purely domestic
punishment strategy where, if a country￿ s tari⁄ deviates from its equilibrium level, the capital
allocation and the tari⁄ in that country revert to their long-run noncooperative levels; (ii) an
international punishment strategy where, if a country￿ s tari⁄deviates from its equilibrium level,
the capital allocation and the tari⁄ in both countries revert to their long-run noncooperative
levels. (One could consider more severe international punishment strategies, for example a
reversion to autarky; this would only strengthen the argument we are making here.) Suppose
the optimal international agreement with perfect enforcement entails tari⁄tA, and the optimal
domestic-commitment tari⁄ in the absence of international agreements is tDC > tA. Now
suppose that a purely domestic punishment strategy is not enough to sustain tDC, so that the
domestic commitment problem remains partially unsolved. We then ask: can an international
36punishment strategy sustain tA? If this is the case, then we can say that the international
punishment strategy helps governments fully solve their domestic commitment problems. We
conjecture that there will be a region of parameters for which this is the case. However, a
rigorous examination of self-enforcing trade agreements will have to await further research.
Second, in our model a government cannot receive contributions from foreign capital-owners.
How would foreign lobbying a⁄ect the trade agreement? A thorough examination of this ques-
tion would require changing the production structure of the model, because we assumed that
foreign capital is ￿xed. Since the interaction between lobbying and capital mobility is central
to our arguments, we would need to modify the model so that foreign capital can move across
sectors.38 But one can reasonably speculate on what results would emerge in a model of this
type. Suppose that the government￿ s objective is given by aW + Cd + bCf, where Cd and
Cf are domestic and foreign contributions (as in Gawande, Krishna and Robbins, 2006); and
the parameter b > 0 captures the government￿ s valuation of foreign contributions relative to
domestic contributions.
Consider our basic two-period model, and focus ￿rst on the benchmark case of ￿xed capital.
In this case, since foreign exporters bene￿t from reducing tari⁄s, the presence of foreign lobbying
will reduce both the noncooperative tari⁄ level (tJ) and the tari⁄ level set by the agreement
(t ), and if b is su¢ ciently high these tari⁄ levels will turn into import subsidies. Note that
these implications of foreign lobbying are not speci￿c to our model, and apply also to the
"standard" models of trade agreements a￿la Grossman-Helpman (1995). Next consider the
opposite benchmark case of perfect capital mobility. If entry fully dissipates rents in the foreign
country just as in the domestic country, then the optimal agreement would entail free trade, by
the same logic as in our basic model. Thus a reasonable conjecture is that introducing foreign
lobbying in our model would decrease the tari⁄level set by the agreement, but this e⁄ect would
be smaller the more mobile is capital.
Third, our model has the feature that trade protection in the M sector does not a⁄ect
the returns to capital in the long run (when capital is perfectly mobile). This is due to the
fact that the returns to capital in the N sector are independent of the capital allocation. An
important consequence of this feature is that the lobby in the M sector attaches no value to trade
protection in the long run. It is natural to ask how our results would extend to environments
38This would not be a minor change because, for returns to capital to be equalized across sectors in the long
run (in both countries), we would need to introduce some curvature in the model. If the production structure
is linear as in the current model, all capital will concentrate in one sector, at least in one country.
37where Stolper-Samuelson e⁄ects are present, so that protection in the M sector would a⁄ect
the returns to capital even in the long run. This would be the case, for example, if the N
sector uses capital and labor. Even if this is the case, however, the impact of trade protection
on the returns to capital will be stronger in the short run than in the long run, and this is the
main driving force behind our results. Also note that, if sector M is small relative to the whole
economy, trade protection in this sector will have only a small impact on the economy-wide
returns to capital, hence in this case our results would hold with little change.39 Finally, the
assumption that trade protection in the M sector does not a⁄ect the long-run return to capital
could be justi￿ed also from a trade-and-growth perspective. Consider an environment in which
capital can be accumulated over time: even if increasing the domestic price of good M had a
substantial impact on the economy-wide returns to capital, in the long run this would trigger
a change in investment that would bring back the return to capital to its steady-state level,
which is pinned down by the discount rate.
39How should one think about the size of sector M? One could simply think of sector M as a narrowly
de￿ned good, in which case the sector would be small in relation to the whole economy almost by de￿nition.
Alternatively, and perhaps more accurately, one could think of sector M as a subset of goods whose producers
are organized to lobby together for protection. Even in this case, however, given the di¢ culties associated with
collective action among di⁄erent producers, it is reasonable to assume that sector M is a relatively narrow
subset of goods. We also note that in the existing empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy
it is commonly assumed that the relevant level of aggregation for organized lobbies is the 3-digit SIC level; a
sector de￿ned at this level is fairly small relative to the whole economy.
38Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
We start by deriving ^ x. Plugging tJ(x) into the equal-returns condition and solving in x we
￿nd the unique solution:
^ x = 2a
￿
3v ￿ 4
4a ￿ 1
￿
Note that the condition on a assumed in the Proposition implies that a > 1=4 and hence the
denominator of the previous expression for ^ x is positive, and also the numerator is positive
given that we have assumed that v > 3=2. Also, one can show that the condition assumed in
the proposition ensures ^ x < 1:
The equilibrium tari⁄ is given by
^ t = t
J(^ x) =
1
3
[1 +
4 ￿ 2a
4a ￿ 1
(3v ￿ 4)]
Di⁄erentiating with respect to a,
d^ t
da
= ￿
7
3
￿
3v ￿ 4
(4a ￿ 1)2 < 0
which shows the last part of the claim.
We need to show that imports are positive at the equilibrium we just found. This requires
1￿^ x > ^ t. Plugging in the values for ^ x and ^ t we get a > (6v￿7)=6(2￿v); which is the condition
assumed in the proposition.
For future reference we also show that the xer(x) curve is upward (downward) sloping below
(above) the tJ(x) curve. Di⁄erentiation shows
dxer(t)
dt
=
1=2 ￿ (a=4x)(3ter(x) ￿ ￿x)
1=2 + (a=12x)(3ter(x) ￿ ￿x) ￿ c(ter(x);x)=x
(10)
The condition on a in the proposition implies that a > 1=3, which in turn implies that the
denominator is positive. On the other hand, it is easy to show that the numerator is positive
if t < tJ(x) and negative if t > tJ(x). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: See the proof of the more general Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 3: See the proof of the more general Proposition 5.
39Proof of Proposition 4: The ￿rst step is to write a convenient expression for the objective
￿(￿ t;xer(￿ t)). Adding and subtracting total contributions C = xc in expression (3), and recalling
that the net rate of return to capital must be equal to one, we can write
￿(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) = aW(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) + C(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) + aW
￿(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) + b x
If ￿ t ￿ tW(xer(￿ t)); then there are positive contributions and
aW(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) + C(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) = aW(t
W(x
er(￿ t));x
er(￿ t))
On the other hand, if ￿ t < tW(xer(￿ t)), then contributions are zero. Noting that ￿ t ￿ tW(xer(￿ t)) if
and only if ￿ t ￿ tW, we can write
￿(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) =
￿
aW(tW(xer(￿ t));xer(￿ t)) + aW ￿(￿ t;xer(￿ t)) + b x if ￿ t ￿ tW
aW(￿ t;xer(￿ t)) + aW ￿(￿ t;xer(￿ t)) + b x if ￿ t < tW (11)
The next step is to show that ￿(￿ t;xer(￿ t)) in (11) is decreasing in ￿ t. If ￿ t < tW, there are no
contributions and xer(￿ t) is a line with slope one, so the claim is easy to verify. Let us focus
on the less straightforward case ￿ t ￿ tW. We want to show that F(￿ t) ￿ W(tW(xer(￿ t));xer(￿ t)) +
W ￿(￿ t;xer(￿ t)) is decreasing in ￿ t for ￿ t > tW. Applying the Envelope Theorem, then:
F
0(￿ t) = Wx(t
W(x
er(￿ t));x
er(￿ t))dx
er(￿ t)=d￿ t + W
￿
t (￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) + W
￿
x(￿ t;x
er(￿ t))dx
er(￿ t)=d￿ t
Since W ￿
t < 0 and dxer(￿ t)=dt > 0, it su¢ ces to show that Wx(tW(xer(￿ t));xer(￿ t)) and W ￿
x(￿ t;xer(￿ t))
are both negative. The second part is obvious given that the only e⁄ect of x on W ￿ is through
terms of trade, and an increase in x worsens Foreign￿ s terms of trade. To show the ￿rst part,
note that it is equivalent to Wx(tW(x);x) < 0 for x > xW. Some simple algebra reveals that:
Wx(t
W(x);x) = p(t
W(x);x) ￿ 1 (12)
Given the de￿nition of xW (i.e., p(tW(xW);xW) = 1), the claim follows directly.
Now notice that, if t￿(xz) < ter(xz), by de￿nition of t￿(xz) the point (t￿(xz);xz) is superior
to the point (ter(xz);xz), which in turn is superior to all the other points on the curve e xer(￿ t)
for ￿ t > ter(xz). On the other hand, if ter(xz) < t￿(xz) then all points on the vertical segment
of curve e xer(￿ t) are dominated by the point (ter(xz);xz).40 Hence, in this case, the optimal tari⁄
binding is simply ter(xz). Of course this is true only as long as xz ￿ xft, otherwise the optimum
is free trade.
40This follows from the fact that (as can be easily veri￿ed) ￿ is concave in t.
40To prove that ^ t ￿ ￿ tA is (weakly) increasing in z, note that (a) ter(x) is increasing in the
relevant range; and (b) t￿(x) = x=a is increasing in x. As a consequence, min(ter(xz);t￿(xz))
is increasing in xz, and hence decreasing in z, which implies the claim.
Point (iii) follows from the observations we made previously, that (a) ^ t￿ ￿ tA is increasing in
a for z = 0 and (b) ^ t ￿ ￿ tA is decreasing in a for z = 1. Since the problem is continuous in z,
the claim follows. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider ￿rst the case z = 1. Following a similar logic as in the
proof of Proposition 4, the objective can be written as
G(￿ t) ￿ J(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) =
￿
aW(tW(xer(￿ t));xer(￿ t)) + b x if ￿ t ￿ tW
aW(￿ t;xer(￿ t)) + b x if ￿ t < tW (13)
Consider ￿rst the case ￿ t < tW. Di⁄erentiation yields:
G
0(￿ t) = aWt(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) + aWx(￿ t;x
er(￿ t))
where we have used the fact that dxer=d￿ t = 1 for ￿ t < tW. Note that ￿ t < tW implies ￿ t < tW(xer(￿ t))
and hence Wt(￿ t;xer(￿ t)) > 0, whereas Wt(tW;xer(tW)) = 0. Turning to the second term above,
di⁄erentiation yields
Wx(￿ t;x
er(￿ t)) = (1=2)(1 ￿ (v ￿ 1) ￿ 2￿ t)
It is easy to show that this is equal to zero for ￿ t = tW, and hence is positive for ￿ t < tW. Thus,
G0(￿ t) > 0 for ￿ t < tW. The previous arguments establish also that G0(tW) = 0.
Now consider the case ￿ t > tW. In this case, di⁄erentiation yields (using the Envelope
Theorem):
G
0(￿ t) = [aWx(t
W(x
er(￿ t));x
er(￿ t))]dx
er=d￿ t
We have already established that dxer=d￿ t > 0 (see proof of Proposition 1) and that Wx(tW(xer(￿ t));xer(￿ t)) <
0 for ￿ t > tW (see proof of Proposition 4). Therefore G0(￿ t) < 0 for ￿ t > tW, and the result follows
immediately.
Next consider the case z < 1. Noting that J(￿ t;x) is maximized by tJ(x) and applying the
same logic as in the proof of Proposition 4, one can show that
￿ t
DC(z) =
￿
min(ter(xz);tJ(xz)) for xz ￿ xW
tW for xz < xW
But min(ter(xz);tJ(xz)) = ter(xz), hence the claim. Q.E.D.
41Proof of Proposition 7: We start by noting that we can set t = ￿ t without loss of generality.
Using ￿(s) as the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier of the constraint on the control, u(s) + zx(s) ￿ 0,
and ￿(s) as the multiplier function of the pure state constraint, y(s) ￿ 0, then we have the
following Hamiltonian:
H = e
￿￿s￿(t;x) + ￿ [u + zx] ￿ ￿y + ￿xu + ￿y[(￿ + z)y ￿ g(t;x)]
Necessary conditions for optimality are Ht = Hu = 0, the Euler equations _ ￿x = ￿Hx and
_ ￿y = ￿Hy, the constraints u+zx ￿ 0, y ￿ 0, and the complementary slackness (CS) conditions:
￿ ￿ 0, ￿(u + zx) = 0, and ￿ ￿ 0, ￿y = 0.
The condition Ht = 0 implies:
e
￿￿s￿t ￿ ￿ygt = 0 (14)
while Hu = 0 implies ￿ + ￿x = 0, or
￿ = ￿￿x (15)
The Euler equation _ ￿x = ￿Hx yields:
_ ￿x = ￿e
￿￿s￿x ￿ ￿z + ￿ygx (16)
while _ ￿y = ￿Hy yields:
_ ￿y = ￿ ￿ ￿y(￿ + z) (17)
Our methodology is to guess that the solution is the one stated in the Proposition and verify
that it satis￿es necessary and su¢ cient conditions for an optimum. Our conjectured solution
entails three phases: the ￿rst phase starts at s = 0 and entails t = t￿(xz(s)); the second phase
starts at s = e s, where e s is de￿ned implicitly by t￿(xz(~ s)) = ter(xz(~ s)), and entails t = ter(xz(s));
the third stage starts at s = sft, where sft is de￿ned as the time at which e￿zs^ x reaches xft,
and entails a steady state where t = 0 and x = xft.
To check this conjecture, we move backwards, checking ￿rst that free trade can be a steady
state. From (14), using Wt + W ￿
t = 0 at t = 0, and noting that gt = 1 (since there are no
contributions in this case), then we get
￿y(s) = e
￿￿sx
ft (18)
This implies _ ￿y = ￿￿￿y. Plugging in (17) yields ￿(s) = z￿y(s). Hence, using (18) we get:
￿(s) = e
￿￿szx
ft (19)
42Note that this clearly satis￿es the condition ￿(s) ￿ 0.
Now, since at the conjectured steady state we have u = 0, then u+zx = zx > 0, and hence
the CS conditions imply ￿ = 0. Equation (15) then implies that
￿x(s) = 0 (20)
Plugging this and _ ￿x = 0 into the Euler equation (16) yields e￿￿s￿x = ￿ygx, which is satis￿ed
because at free trade ￿x = xftgx (since Wx + W ￿
x = 0 at free trade) and (18) implies ￿ygx =
e￿￿sxftgx.
We can now move backwards to the second phase, s 2 [e s;sft]. We will solve for ￿x and ￿y
and check that ￿;￿ are positive (as required by the CS conditions). Condition (14) can be used
to solve for ￿y:
￿y = e
￿￿s￿t=gt (21)
Plugging this result and ￿ = ￿￿x in (16), and using dter=dx = ￿gx=gt, yields:
_ ￿x = ￿xz ￿ e
￿￿sd￿
dx
jg=0
Now, since e￿￿s d￿
dx jg=0 evaluated at x = xz(s) is merely a function of time, we can denote it
as ￿(s), and hence we have a di⁄erential equation, which can be solved imposing ￿x(sft) = 0.
This yields:
￿x(s) =
Z sft
s
￿(v)e
￿z(v￿s)dv (22)
In the proof of Proposition 4 we established that ￿(￿ t;xer(￿ t)) is decreasing in ￿ t. This implies
that d￿
dx jg=0< 0, which in turn implies ￿x(s) < 0, and hence ￿(s) > 0.
The only condition left to check for the second phase is ￿(s) ￿ 0 for s 2 [e s;sft]. From the
Euler equation (17), this is true if
￿(s) = ￿
0
y(s) + (￿ + z)￿y(s) ￿ 0
Letting ter(s) ￿ ter(xz(s)) and f(s) ￿
￿t(ter(s);xz(s))
gt(ter(s);xz(s)) , and using (21), we have
￿(s) = z￿y(s) + e
￿￿sf
0(s) (23)
We need to consider two cases, corresponding to x < xW and x ￿ xW. If x < xW then ￿ t(x) =
ter(x) < tW(x), so there are no contributions. Di⁄erentiation shows that f(s) = xz(s)￿ater(s),
which given ter(x) < t￿(x) = x=a is positive, and hence ￿y > 0. Using dter=dx = 1, we ￿nd:
f
0(s) = (a ￿ 1)zx
z(s)
43The condition a ￿ v￿1
2￿v together with v > 3=2 implies a > 1, so we conclude that ￿(s) ￿ 0 for
s 2 [e s;sft] such that xz(s) < xW.
Now consider the second case, with x ￿ xW. Note that equation (23) implies ￿(s) =
e￿￿s(zf(s) + f0(s)). Di⁄erentiation then shows that
￿(s) =
e￿￿sz
gt
￿
￿t ￿ x
￿
￿tt
dter
dx
+ ￿tx ￿
￿t
gt
(gtt
dter
dx
+ gtx)
￿￿
Plugging in t = ter(x) and after (a lot of) simpli￿cation we get
￿(s) =
e￿￿sza
6gt
a(x(8 ￿ 3v) ￿ (3v ￿ 4)) ￿ 3x(v ￿ 1)
2a(3v ￿ 4) ￿ x(4a ￿ 1)
Since x < ^ x =
2a(3v￿4)
4a￿1 , the denominator is positive. As for the numerator, since x ￿ xW = 3v￿4
2 ,
then x(8 ￿ 3v) ￿ (3v ￿ 4) ￿ 0. Then, using a ￿ v￿1
2￿v, we get
a(x(8 ￿ 3v) ￿ (3v ￿ 4)) ￿ 3x(v ￿ 1) ￿
v ￿ 1
2 ￿ v
(x(8 ￿ 3v) ￿ (3v ￿ 4) ￿ 3x(2 ￿ v))
=
v ￿ 1
2 ￿ v
(2x ￿ (3v ￿ 4)) ￿ 0
where the last inequality comes again from x ￿ xW. Therefore, ￿(s) ￿ 0 for all s 2 [e s;sft].
Moving now to the ￿rst phase (i.e., s < e s), our conjecture y < 0 implies by the CS conditions
that
￿(s) = 0 (24)
Moreover, t(s) = t￿(xz(s)) implies ￿t = 0, and hence from (14) we get ￿y = 0 and hence
￿y(e s) = 0. The second Euler equation (17) is trivially satis￿ed with
￿y(s) = 0 (25)
and ￿ = 0. To check the ￿rst Euler equation (16) we use ￿ = ￿￿x and ￿y = 0 to obtain:
_ ￿x = ￿e
￿￿s￿x + ￿xz
Solving the above di⁄erential equation yields:
￿x(s) = ￿x(e s)e
￿z(e s￿s) +
Z e s
s
￿x(v)e
￿z(v￿s)￿￿vdv (26)
where ￿x(s) is shorthand for ￿x(t￿(xz(s);xz(s)). We must now check that ￿x(s) ￿ 0, so that
￿(s) ￿ 0. We know from (22) that ￿x(e s) ￿ 0. Thus, it is su¢ cient to establish that ￿x(s) ￿ 0
44for all s 2 [0;e s[. We need to do this for the case of positive contributions (t￿(x) > tW(x)) and
the case of zero contributions (t￿(x) ￿ tW(x)). If there are no contributions, using Wx +W ￿
x =
(xft ￿ x)=2 we ￿nd
￿x = ￿(a=2)(x ￿ x
ft) + (p ￿ 1 ￿ x=2)
Since x > xft, the ￿rst term is negative. To show that the second term is also negative, note
that there are two cases: (1) t￿(x) ￿ ter(x) ￿ tW(x) and (2) t￿(x) ￿ tW(x) ￿ ter(x). In case
(1) p(ter(x);x) = 1, which implies that p(t￿(x);x) < 1. In case (2) we would have x > xW,
which implies that p(tW(x);x) < 1 and hence p(t￿(x);x) < 1. Thus, the second term above is
negative.
If there are positive contributions, then (applying the Envelope Theorem) we obtain
￿x = a(Wx(t
W(x);x) + W
￿
x(t;x)) + (p ￿ c ￿ 1 + x(px ￿ cx))
Given that ter(x) > t￿(x) > tW(x), then x > xW and consequently Wx(tW(x);x) < 0, as
we showed in the proof of Proposition 4. W ￿
x is always negative. p ￿ c ￿ 1 is zero at ter(x),
hence it must be negative at t￿(x) given that t￿(x) < ter(x). Hence, it su¢ ces to show
that px ￿ cx < 0 when evaluated at t￿(x). But px ￿ cx = ￿1=2 ￿ (1=x)[Cx ￿ C=x]. Since
Cx = (a=4)(t￿(x) ￿ tW(x)) > 0, then it is su¢ cient to establish that 1=2 ￿ c(t￿(x);x)=x > 0.
But in the proof of Proposition 1 we already established that 1=2 ￿ c(tJ(x);x)=x > 0. Given
that c(tJ(x);x) > c(t￿(x);x), then this last inequality implies the previous one.
We have established that the conjectured paths for x and t together with the implied state
variable y and costate variables ￿x and ￿y given by (26), (22), (20) and (25), (21), (18) in
phases 1, 2, 3, respectively, and Kuhn-Tucker multipliers ￿ = ￿￿x and ￿ given by (24), (23),
and (19) in phases 1, 2, and 3, respectively, satisfy all the necessary conditions for an optimum.
We now show that the conditions for su¢ ciency are also satis￿ed.
We need to show that the maximized Hamiltonian is concave in (x;y). The maximized
Hamiltonian is:
H
0(u(x;y);t(x;y);x;y;￿x;￿y;s) = e
￿￿s￿(t(x;y);x) ￿ ￿xzx + ￿y [(￿ + z)y ￿ g(t(x;y);x)]
Clearly, it is su¢ cient to show that d2H0=dx2 < 0.
Let us ￿rst analyze this in the ￿rst phase, where t(x;y) = t￿(x), ￿t = 0 and ￿y = 0.
Di⁄erentiating and using dt￿=dx = ￿￿xt=￿tt yields d2H0=dx2 = (e￿￿s=￿tt)(￿xx￿tt ￿ ￿2
xt).
45The SOC for t￿(x) requires that ￿tt < 0. Hence d2H0=dx2 < 0 if and only if ￿xx￿tt ￿￿2
xt > 0,
which is a condition for ￿ to be concave in (x;t) at (xz(s);t￿(xz(s))). Di⁄erentiation yields
￿tt = ￿a=2 + 3a=4 ￿ 3a=4 = (a=2)(3=2 ￿ 1) ￿ 3a=4 = ￿a=2 < 0
and ￿xx￿tt ￿ ￿2
xt = (a=24)(5a + 12 + a) ￿ 1=4; which is positive given a > 1.
Now let us move to the second and third phases, where t = ter(xz(s)) and g = 0. After
some simpli￿cations, and using L(x) ￿ e￿sd2H0=dx2, we obtain:
L(x) = 2￿txdt
er=dx + ￿xx + ￿tt(dt
er=dx)
2 + ￿td
2t
er=dx
2
= dt
er=dx ￿ a=2 ￿ 1 ￿ a=2(dt
er=dx)
2 + ￿td
2t
er=dx
2
We need to show that L(x) < 0. We need to consider the case in which there are no contributions
and also the case when there are contributions. If there are no contributions, then dter=dx = 1,
and hence L(x) = ￿a < 0.
If there are contributions, then de￿ne ￿ ￿
p
x(2a(3v ￿ 4) ￿ x(4a ￿ 1)) > 0: (Note that we
showed above that x(2a(3v ￿ 4) ￿ x(4a ￿ 1)) > 0.) After some manipulation we get,
L(x) =
2(a + 1)[x(4a ￿ 1) ￿ a(3v ￿ 4)]￿
2 + a2(x + ax ￿ a)(3v ￿ 4)2 ￿ (5a2 + 2a ￿ 2)￿
3
9a￿
3
At x = xW = 3v￿4
2 , L(x) = a
3
￿
1 ￿
4a(2￿v)
3v￿4
￿
. But a ￿ v￿1
2￿v implies that this is negative. Since
L(xW) < 0, we can prove that L(x) < 0 for x ￿ xW by showing that L0(x) ￿ 0 over this range.
Di⁄erentiating and simplifying we obtain
L
0(x) =
a2(3v ￿ 4)2[a(3v ￿ 4) ￿ x(a(8 ￿ 3v) ￿ 3(v ￿ 1))]
3￿
5
Note that a ￿ v￿1
2￿v implies a(8 ￿ 3v) ￿ 3(v ￿ 1) ￿
2(v￿1)
2￿v > 0, so using x ￿ xW = 3v￿4
2 , we get
L
0(x) ￿
a2(3v ￿ 4)2 ￿
a(3v ￿ 4) ￿ 3v￿4
2 (a(8 ￿ 3v) ￿ 3(v ￿ 1))
￿
3￿
5
=
a2(3v ￿ 4)3[v ￿ 1 ￿ a(2 ￿ v)]
2￿
5 ￿ 0:
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8:
46At time s1, the analysis of the optimal agreement is exactly as in Proposition 7, except that
x1 may be lower than ^ x. Part (iii) of the proposition is thus a simple corollary of Proposition 7.
For parts (i) and (ii), the ￿rst step is to calculate y immediately before s1 as a function of x1,
which we denote h(x1). The value of y immediately after s1 can be computed from the dynamics
of Proposition 7. However, y jumps up at s1 by the amount of ex-ante contributions, which are
equal to the total losses for the two governments from applying tari⁄￿ t(s) rather than free trade
(which is what the two governments would choose in the absence of ex-ante lobbying). Note
that these contributions are zero if x1 = xft and positive if x1 > xft. Therefore, h(xft) = 0 and
h(x1) < 0 for x1 2 (xft; ^ x].
We now derive necessary conditions for an equilibrium and argue that they imply the features
described in the proposition. First, let gJ(x) ￿ g(tJ(x);x) and note that gJ(x) = 0 has only
one solution, x = ^ x (follows from Proposition 1). Second, note that any equilibrium has to
satisfy the following two conditions before the agreement takes e⁄ect at time s1:
1. _ y = (￿ + z)y ￿ gJ(x) (almost everywhere, where _ y is de￿ned);
2. If y < 0 then _ x = ￿zx.
We now show that the path of y(s) before s = s1 must be y = 0 in a ￿rst phase (which
may be empty) and y < 0 in a second phase (which is always non-empty). The key is to argue
that y cannot touch zero from below before s = s1. First note that in equilibrium it must be
gJ(x) ￿ 0 (if gJ(x) < 0 we would have x > ^ x; but x can only rise above ^ x when y = 0, hence
we would have _ y > 0, leading instantly to y > 0, which cannot happen in equilibrium). But by
condition 1 above this implies that, at a given point in time, if y < 0 then _ y < 0. Thus, if y
goes below zero it never touches zero again before s1.
Together with condition 2, this implies that once y falls below zero, _ x = ￿zx until s = s1.
Also note that y = 0 for an interval of time implies x = ^ x. Therefore in the ￿rst (possibly
empty) phase we have y = 0 and x = ^ x, and in the second phase we have y < 0 and _ x = ￿zx
until s = s1, at which point the agreement is signed.
To show that the second phase cannot be empty we proceed by contradiction. Imagine
that this phase was empty. Since s1 > s0 this implies that the ￿rst phase would have to be
non-empty, and x1 = ^ x. But then h(s1) < 0 so it is not possible that y = 0 just before s1 (i.e.,
at s = s1 ￿ " for " in￿nitely small).
Next we show that x1 > xft, i.e. the reallocation of capital is not completed by time s1.
Suppose by contradiction that x1 ￿ xft. Noting that h(x1) = 0 and gJ(x) > 0 for x ￿ x1,
47then y > 0 just before s1, which is not possible in equilibrium. This also implies that if s1 ￿s0
is su¢ ciently large, then the ￿rst phase must be non-empty. It is also clear that if s1 ￿ s0 is
small then the ￿rst phase must be empty. To see this, just note that since h(x1) < 0 then at
s = s1 ￿ " the value of y must also be negative, ruling out a stage with y = 0 before s1 if
s1 ￿ s0 = ".
We have shown that any equilibrium must have the properties stated in the Proposition.
Now we show that an equilibrium exists. Let ￿(s; ^ s) ￿ gJ(^ xe￿z(s￿^ s)) and note that the no-
arbitrage condition for the second phase of adjustment (i.e., s 2 [^ s;s1)) can be written as a
di⁄erential equation _ y = (￿ + z)y ￿ ￿(s; ^ s) subject to the terminal condition y(s1) = h(x1),
where x1 = ^ xe￿z(s1￿^ s). The solution of this di⁄erential equation is
y(s; ^ s) = h(^ xe
￿z(s1￿^ s))e
￿(￿+z)(s1￿s) +
Z s1
s
￿(v; ^ s)e
￿(￿+z)(v￿s)dv
In equilibrium the value of y at s = ^ s is given by y(^ s; ^ s). This implies that the equilibrium
value of ^ s must satisfy y(^ s; ^ s) ￿ 0. Alternatively, if y(s0;s0) > 0 then given that y(s1;s1) ￿ 0
we see that - by continuity of the function y(s;s) - there must exist a solution to y(^ s; ^ s) = 0,
and each solution ^ s must be higher than s0. This establishes that there is a ￿rst phase with no
adjustment. Q.E.D.
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50Figure 1: The Long Run Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
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